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NEW REASONS TO REMEMBER 
THE ESTATE TAXATION OF REVERSIONS 
F. Philip Manns, Jr.∗ 
Editors’ Synopsis: When a transfer of real property creates a 
future interest in a party without expressly providing whether that 
party must survive all others in possession prior, the common law 
has traditionally refused to imply such a requirement. Recently, 
various reform movements have proposed reversing this rule. 
Where such a reversal fails to likewise negate the reversion 
created by the change, the transferor-possessor of the reversion 
faces complicated tax issues as a result. In this Article, the author 
provides an overview of the various attempts to reverse the rule 
and goes through the complicated actuarial mathematics that are 
required to assess the tax liability of the possessor of the reversion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a transfer of Blackacre by “O to A for life then to B,” B’s interest 
in Blackacre is a future interest, because B is not entitled to present 
possession.1 The express language of the transfer fails to address whether 
B must survive A in order for B (or B’s successors) to take possession of 
Blackacre at A’s death. A rule of construction became necessary, and the 
                                                   
1 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 153 (1936) (“[A] future interest is an interest 
in land, or in a thing other than land, which (a) is not, but may become a present interest; 
and (b) is a segment ownership measured in terms of duration; and (c) is neither inchoate 
dower nor curtesy initiate.”); JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, 
ESTATES AND TRUSTS (3rd ed. 2007) (“A future interest is one that does not become 
possessory immediately upon its creation.”); JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, 
JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 624 (7th ed. 2005) 
(“[I]nterests are called future interests because the person who holds one of them is not 
entitled to present possession or enjoyment of the property but may or will become 
entitled to possession in the future.”) (emphasis in original). 
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common law developed a rule that B’s survival is not implied.2 We can 
call this default rule the no-implied-condition-of-survivorship rule or the 
“NICS rule.”3 Under the NICS rule, because B is not required to survive 
A for B’s successors to take possession of Blackacre at A’s death, B’s 
future interest is classified as an indefeasibly vested remainder.4 As such, 
B may transfer that remainder during B’s life,5 and if B holds that 
indefeasibly vested remainder at death, the remainder transfers by B’s 
will—if B leaves an effective will—or by intestacy.6 
Centuries after the common law NICS rule developed, the federal 
estate tax arose. The NICS rule leads to unfortunate tax results because 
the value of B’s indefeasibly vested remainder must be included in B’s 
federal gross estate when B dies, even though her interest never took 
                                                   
2 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 197 (1998). (“At common law, 
conditions of survivorship are not implied with respect to future interests (whether in 
trust or otherwise).”); WILLIAM H. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS 
& ESTATES 409 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Roberts v. Roberts, 80 Eng. Rep. 1002, 1009 (K.B. 
1613)); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & 
THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 1067 (4th ed. 2006); Verner F. Chaffin, 
Descendible Future Interests in Georgia: The Effect of the Preference for Early Vesting, 
7 GA. L. REV. 443 (1973) (“In Anglo-American law, there is virtual unanimity that a gift 
is presumed to be vested and not contingent. Moreover, this strong constructional 
preference for vested interests carries with it a presumption in favor of early vesting 
rather than a more remote vesting.”). 
3 Authors have offered various reasons to support the common law’s preference for 
vested interests. See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 2, at 411–14. See also Edward H. 
Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1985); 
Daniel M. Schuyler, Drafting, Tax, and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting, 
46 ILL. L. REV. 407, 409–11 (1951). 
4 See DUKEMINIER, JOHANSON, LINDGREN & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 626 (“A 
remainder is vested if (1) it is given to a presently ascertained person and (2) it is not 
subject to a condition precedent (other than the termination of the preceding estates).”). 
See also DOBRIS, STERK & LESLIE, supra note 1, at 788; WAGGONER, ALEXANDER, 
FELLOWS & GALLANIS, supra note 2, at 1035. 
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 51, cmt. 9 (2003) (B may transfer her 
indefeasibly vested remainder during her life unless there is an effective spendthrift 
restraint upon transfer.). 
6 See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 148 (1995) (“Nothing is more settled in the law of remainders than that 
an indefeasibly vested remainder is transmissible to the remainderman’s heirs or devisees 
upon the remainderman’s death. . . . Inheritability of vested remainders was recognized in 
the time of Edward I, and devisability was recognized with the Statute of Wills in 
1540.”). 
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effect in possession.7 That unfortunate result can be avoided by making 
B’s remainder contingent on B’s surviving A; nothing is included in B’s 
federal gross estate if B dies before the, contingent, remainder takes 
effect in possession.8 Consequently, it has been said that a careful drafter 
never creates an inheritable future interest.9 Not surprisingly, proponents 
of reversing the NICS rule justify the change as providing by default 
what well-drafted documents do by express provision.10 
But, of course, when a well-drafted document makes possession un-
der future interests contingent on survival, the document also provides 
alternative dispositions when any such contingencies fail.11 If the 
document merely requires survival of beneficiaries, yet does not provide 
                                                   
7 See I.R.C. § 2033 (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”); 
Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324 (providing that inclusion occurs when “the decedent 
owns any beneficial interest in a trust which survives his death”). Because B’s 
indefeasibly vested remainder passes to her successors, it is property of the decedent at 
the time of her death. Note that if, while B is alive, her contingent remainder takes effect 
in possession and she later dies owing Blackacre, the value of Blackacre at B’s death will 
be included in B’s federal gross estate; neither the NICS rule nor its reversal are of any 
moment in such a case. The complicated estate tax situation described in this article 
occurs when B dies before her remainder takes effect in possession; yet, her federal gross 
estate includes the value of the remainder even though B never possessed Blackacre (i.e., 
B possessed the remainder but never possessed Blackacre itself). 
8 See Rev. Rul. 55-438, 1955-2 C.B. 601. 
9 See infra note 34 and accompanying text. Recently, that is, during the last 20 
years, the injunction against inheritable future interests has been softened by the 1986 
enactment of the generation-skipping transfer tax, I.R.C. §§ 2601–2664. Optimal estate 
planning sometimes prefers estate taxation in a child’s estate to GST taxation of a trust 
upon the child’s death, when the property passes to grandchildren. One way to 
accomplish that is to create a vested remainder in a child; another, more flexible, 
technique is to create a special power of appointment in the child. With a special power 
of appointment, the child can choose to trigger estate taxation in the child’s estate rather 
than having the greater GST tax apply. The child triggers estate tax inclusion by 
exercising her power to create yet another power that falls within I.R.C. Section 
2041(a)(3), a section colloquially called “the Delaware Tax Trap” by estate planners. For 
much more on this issue, see Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Adventures in 
Generation-Skipping, or How We Learned to Love the Delaware Tax Trap 24 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75 (1989); James P. Spica, A Practical Look at Springing the 
Delaware Tax Trap to Avert Generation Skipping Tax, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 165 
(2006); James P. Spica, A Trap for the Wary: Delaware’s Anti-Delaware-Tax-Trap 
Statute Is Too Clever by Half (of Infinity), 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 673 (2009). 
10 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type 
Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309 (1996). 
11 See id. at 2311–12. 
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an alternative taker if all such survival contingencies fail, the transferor 
thereby retains a reversion, because the property will revert to the 
transferor if all the survival contingencies fail.12 
That was precisely the problem in the famous case of Estate of Spie-
gel v. Commissioner,13 in which Spiegel’s irrevocable inter vivos trust 
created remainders in his children and grandchildren contingent on such 
descendants surviving Spiegel, yet no trust provision addressed what 
would occur if Spiegel outlived all of the beneficiaries.14 Consequently, 
Spiegel possessed a reversion at his death, and although its value was 
tiny—a mere 0.007% of the trust principal15 (for there is evanescent 
probability of a grandfather surviving his children and grandchildren)—
the entire trust principal was included in Spiegel’s federal gross estate 
under then-applicable law.16 This surprising and unfair result unleashed a 
maelstrom of criticism that, within months, generated legislative solu-
tions described by Professor Bittker as a “mélange,”17 and culminated in 
a 1954 legislative solution that continues unchanged to the present.18 
Were the circumstances in Spiegel to arise today, only the value of the 
                                                   
12 A reversion exists whenever a transferor transfers less than all she owns. See 1 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.16 (A. James Casner ed. 1952) (“A reversion is the 
interest remaining in the grantor, or in the successor in interest of a testator, who transfers 
a vested estate of a lesser quantum than that of the vested estate which he has.”); See also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS § 154 (1936) (“A reversionary 
interest is any future interest left in a transferor or his successor in interest; A reversion is 
any reversionary interest which is not subject to a condition precedent; A possibility of 
reverter is any reversionary interest which is subject to a condition precedent.”). 
13 335 U.S. 701 (1949). 
14 See id. at 703. 
15 See id. at 733 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
16 See id. at 707. 
17 Boris I. Bittker, Church and Spiegel: The Legislative Sequel, 59 YALE L.J. 395, at 
401 (1950) [hereinafter Bittker, Legislative Sequel] (describing legislative solution); see 
also Boris I. Bittker, The Church and Spiegel Cases: Section 811(c) Gets a New Lease on 
Life, 58 Yale L.J. 825 (1949) [hereinafter Bittker, Lease on Life] (comprehensively 
describing Spiegel and its companion case, Commissioner v. Church’s Estate, 335 U.S. 
632 (1949)); Charles Looker, Estate Taxation of Living Trusts: The Church and Spiegel 
Decisions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1949) (advocating remedial regulations or legislation 
to avoid the potential flood of litigation brought on by the Church and Spiegel cases). 
18 The 1949 legislative changes were made by Pub. L. No. 81-378, 63 Stat. 891 
(1949), and are described in Bittker, Legislative Sequel, supra note 17, at 401–13. The 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 substantially changed the 1949 law and enacted the 
present version of section 2037 of the Code. See Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 382 
(1954). 
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reversion at Spiegel’s death—the 0.007% amount—would be included in 
his federal gross estate.19 
Cases addressing the estate taxation of reversions, which culminated 
in Spiegel, were preeminent in the early history of the federal estate tax.20 
The estate taxation of reversions generated eight major Supreme Court 
cases in the twenty-three years from 1927 to 1949,21 spawned thoughtful 
academic commentary,22 and produced the 1949 legislative mélange that 
provoked still more commentary,23 yet section 2037 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 soon thereafter relegated the estate taxation of 
reversions to the sidelines. 
After all the sound and fury that attended its birth, 
§ 2037 might have been expected to play a major role in 
the administration of the estate tax. The contrary has 
been true. . . . [section] 2037 has generated very few 
judicial or administrative rulings since its enactment. It 
has probably functioned primarily as a trap for the un-
wary, because the reversionary interests that bring it into 
force are usually retained more by mistake than by de-
sign.24 
Now, however, the trap is set to spring on inartful NICS-rule re-
forms, and we have new reasons to remember the estate taxation of 
reversions. From Spiegel, we can observe that whenever the express 
                                                   
19 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 1 (1958). 
20 See BORIS I. BITTKER, ELIAS CLARK & GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH, FEDERAL 
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 372 (8th ed. 2000). 
21 See Spiegel’s Estate v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949); Comm’r v. Church’s 
Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Helvering v. St. 
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935); Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931); 
May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 
(1929); Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545 (1927). 
22 See Bittker, Lease on Life, supra note 17; Bittker, Legislative Sequel, supra note 
17; Hewitt A. Conway, I.R.C. § 811(c)—The Church and Spiegel Interpretation, 34 
CORNELL L.Q. 376 (1949); Louis Einstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the 
Supreme Court, 3 TAX L. REV. 395 (1948); Samuel J. Foosaner, Church-Spiegel 
Decisions, A New Bombshell to Existing Trusts, 27 TAXES 444 (1949); Looker, supra 
note 17; William J. Schrenk, Jr. and Richard V. Wellman, The Church and Spiegel Cases, 
47 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1949); Note, The Church and Spiegel Cases: The Meaning of A 
Transfer Effective at Death, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 533 (1949). 
23 See Bittker, Legislative Sequel, supra note 17. 
24 BITTKER, ELIAS & MCCOUCH, supra note 20, at 383. 
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provisions of a transfer or a rule of construction require a future interest 
holder to survive until that future interest takes effect in possession, the 
possibility of a failed survival contingency exists, and if an alternative 
taker is not specified, a reversion arises in the transferor. These rever-
sions give rise to complicated estate tax issues, including life contingen-
cy actuarial mathematics. 
Consequently, both well-drafted documents and well-drafted NICS-
rule-reversal reforms should negate the transferor’s reversion by provid-
ing for some taker other than the transferor under all contingencies. UPC 
section 2-707 appears to do so, that is, reverse the NICS rule and negate 
the transferor’s reversion under all contingencies. However, other NICS-
rule-reversal reforms do not negate the transferor’s reversion resulting in 
thorny and even intractable estate and gift tax questions. Although 
commentators have extensively debated the substantive merits of 
reversing the NICS rule,25 no one has comprehensively analyzed the gift 
and estate tax consequences that arise when the transferor’s reversion is 
not negated as part of a NICS-rule-reversal reform.26 
When a NICS-rule-reversal reform does not negate the transferor’s 
reversion, an estate tax problem exists because the transferor’s reversion 
will be taxable in the transferor’s estate, and that requires use of complex 
life contingency actuarial mathematics.27 Gift tax complications also 
                                                   
25 See e.g., Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or 
More like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1993) (Professor Ascher 
does not address section 2-707’s NICS-rule reversal, but does criticize the anti-lapse 
negation rule, which exists in UPC sections 2-603, 2-706, and 2-707.); David M. Becker, 
Eroding the Common Law Paradigm for the Creation of Property Interests and the 
Hidden Costs of Law Reform, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 773 (2005); David M. Becker, Uniform 
Probate Code Section 2-707 and the Experienced Estate Planner: Unexpected Disasters 
and How to Avoid Them, 47 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1999); Laura E. Cunningham, The 
Hazards of Tinkering with the Common Law of Future Interests: The California 
Experience, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 667 (1997); Dukeminier, supra note 6. 
26 The thorny estate and gift tax consequences exist only if the transfer is both 
irrevocable and made while the transferor is living. If the transfer is made in the 
transferor’s will or is otherwise effective only at the transferor’s death, the estate tax 
consequences will be identical whether the NICS rule is applied or not, and no gift tax 
issue will arise because there will have been no lifetime gift. However, to say that the 
problem is limited to irrevocable inter vivos transfers does not significantly diminish its 
importance. Persons whose estates are potentially subject to the estate tax are the most 
likely to make irrevocable inter vivos transfers, and likely to do so with significant 
amounts of property. 
27 Whether the transferor’s reversion is taxable under Code sections 2033 or 2037 
will depend on whether the NICS rule reversal reverses the NICS rule as applied to the 
reversion. See infra Section III.E. 
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arise for the same reason; complex life contingency mathematics become 
relevant because the gift tax value is reduced by the value of the rever-
sion, except when, as often will be the case, the transferor and transferee 
are members of the same family.28 
This Article first addresses whether UPC section 2-707 both reverses 
the NICS rule and negates the transferor’s reversion and concludes that it 
does, although it cites some well-known trusts and estates commentators 
who seem to read it otherwise. The Article then examines NICS-rule-
reversal reforms that have not negated the transferor’s reversion and 
explains that those reforms create complicated transfer tax problems. The 
Article comprehensively demonstrates the nature of the transfer tax 
problems by discussing the estate taxation of reversions under Code 
sections 2033 and 2037. Section 2037 is particularly difficult to under-
stand, and surprisingly little explanation of its operation can be found in 
case law, administrative pronouncements, or commentary. This Article 
seeks to cure that by using a series of hypothetical cases to demonstrate 
its application. Lastly, this Article argues that any reform reversing the 
NICS rule should also negate the transferor’s reversion. 
II.   THE NICS RULE AND ITS NEGATION BY 
UPC SECTION 2-707 
The NICS rule is a part of a sub-rule of the broader “rule of early 
vesting” (REV), which is a rule of construction that promotes the earliest 
indefeasible vesting of future interests. The REV consists of three sub-
rules: (1) conditions are not implied; (2) when the first sub-rule yields 
because conditions are expressly stated in a transfer, those conditions are 
construed as divesting conditions subsequent (creating vested remainders 
subject to divestment) rather than conditions precedent (creating contin-
gent remainders);29 and (3) all time-defined conditions, whether subse-
                                                   
28 Code section 2702 provides special rules to determine the value of a gift when an 
individual makes a transfer in trust to or for the benefit of a member of the individual’s 
family and the individual or an applicable family member retains an interest in the trust. 
Unless the retained interest is a “qualified interest” (generally limited to annuities), Code 
section 2702 requires that the retained interest be valued at zero. Consequently, because a 
reversion arising from the reversal of the NICS rule never would be such a “qualified 
interest,” such reversions would be valued at zero when the transferor and transferees are 
family members. See I.R.C. § 2702(a). 
29 This preference for vested interests (subject to divestment) rather than contingent 
interests may have originated in a desire to escape the early common law rules that 
caused the destruction (sometimes strategic) of contingent remainders and restricted the 
alienability or devisability of contingent interests. See Schuyler, supra note 3. But see 
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quent or precedent, are evaluated at the earliest possible time to create 
vesting.30 The second sub-rule is largely irrelevant, for virtually all 
jurisdictions have abrogated rules that subjected only contingent inter-
ests—but not vested interests subject to divestment—to destruction and 
to limits on transfer.31 The third sub-rule—evaluating temporal condi-
tions at the earliest time to create vesting—also has been abrogated by 
most jurisdictions.32 
Thus, commentary highly critical of the REV and recommending its 
reform, made between 1951 and 1973, has largely been successful 
because the second and third sub-rules of the REV are either entirely or 
almost entirely abrogated.33 That, of course, leaves open the first sub-
rule—that conditions are not implied. The NICS rule is a particular 
application of that first sub-rule because the NICS rule means that the 
specific condition of a beneficiary’s survival is not implied. 
                                                   
Rabin, supra note 3. Professor Rabin was not convinced that the rule favoring early 
vesting arose primarily in response to the destructibility rule. 
30 Rabin described the rule of early vesting as consisting of three “sub-rules or 
corollaries:” “(1) future interests are construed to become indefeasibly vested at the 
earliest possible time; (2) conditions are not readily implied and are construed as 
narrowly as possible; [and] (3) future interests are characterized as defeasibly vested 
rather than contingent.” Rabin, supra note 3, at 469–70. Chaffin identified two parts: (1) 
a gift is presumed vested and not contingent, and (2) early vesting is presumed rather than 
more remote vesting. See Chaffin, supra note 2, at 443–44. 
31 See T.P Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 
515–20 (2003). 
32 Consider a devise of property in testator’s will to “A for life, remainder to A’s 
surviving children.” Must A’s children survive the testator (T) or A? The third sub-rule—
any condition is evaluated at the earliest possible time—would conclude that A’s children 
need only survive T. Early common law cases so concluded. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 
474 n.49. But by the time Rabin wrote in 1965, he indicated that only four or five 
American jurisdictions continued to apply that rule. See id. at 474 (noting Georgia, 
Hawaii, Nebraska, and possibly Michigan and Pennsylvania). Virginia should be added to 
that list. See Coleman v. Coleman, 500 S.E.2d 507 (Va. 1998). 
33 The principal criticisms are those of Chaffin, supra note 2, Rabin, supra note 3, 
and Schuyler, supra note 3. Rabin, writing in 1965, identified Schuyler as the only work 
criticizing the rule of early vesting at length. Rabin, supra note 3, at 467 n.5. But Rabin 
also noted that “many authorities have voiced doubts concerning the rule.” Id. (citing 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.19 (James A. Casner ed. 1952); J.H.C. MORRIS & W. 
BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 40 (2d ed. 1962); Edward C. Halbach, 
Jr., Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival (pts. 1 & 2), 49 CAL. L. 
REV. 297, 49 CAL. L. REV. 431 (1961) (noted as criticizing some applications of the rule, 
but concluding that on the whole it is desirable); W. Lewis Roberts, Statutory and 
Common Law Definitions of Contingent Remainders, 30 KY. L.J. 61, 71 (1941–1942).). 
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The question then arises: Having set aside the second and third sub-
rules of the rule of early vesting, why not set aside the first sub-rule, 
particularly as to the NICS rule? Why not abrogate the NICS rule and 
require, by default, that all future interest holders survive until posses-
sion? A drafter should never create an inheritable future interest.34 Even 
fiction writers agree.35 Why not create a default rule that mirrors a well-
drafted document? Indeed, that is the principal argument made by the 
drafters of UPC section 2-707.36 
Surprisingly, commentators near uniformly have disliked section 2-
707.37 Only Professor Waggoner, its principal drafter,38 and Professor 
Halbach, co-Reporter for the UPC,39 write in its favor. Although the 
commentary regarding section 2-707 has been nearly uniformly negative, 
the pre-section 2-707 commentary had been nearly uniformly against the 
rule of early vesting.40 The difference was that the earlier writers concen-
trated on the second and third sub-rules of the rule of early vesting—that 
conditions are construed as divesting conditions subsequent (rather than 
conditions precedent) and that any temporal condition is evaluated at the 
earliest possible time. Reversing the second and third sub-rules of the 
rule of early vesting has won wide, but not universal, acceptance. 
Reversing the NICS rule has not. 
                                                   
34 See Chaffin, supra note 2, at 448–49 (noting that Professor Leach categorically 
warned draftsmen to never create an inheritable interest). 
35 See Rabin, supra note 3, at 479 n.81 (“In Louis Auchincloss’ touching short story 
‘The Power of Appointment,’ an ‘expert’ in will drafting had a recurrent nightmare. ‘At 
night he often lay awake and tried to visualize the different ways in which disaster might 
strike. . . . It would be a trust where the remainder vested in a dead person.’ 
AUCHINCLOSS, POWERS OF ATTORNEY 172 (1963).”). 
36 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 197 (Supp. 
2008). 
37 See the sources cited supra note 25, all of which conclude that section 2-707 is 
misguided. 
38 See Waggoner, supra note 10. 
39 See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American 
Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1903–04 (2000); Edward C. Halbach, 
Jr. and Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 
55 ALB. L. REV. 1091 (1992). See also Mary Louise Fellows & Gregory S. Alexander, 
Forty Years of Codification of Estates and Trusts Law: Lessons for the Next Generation, 
40 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1065–71 (2006) (discussing debate and generally sympathetic to 
UPC section 2-707). 
40 See Schuyler, supra note 3; Rabin, supra note 3; Chaffin, supra note 2. In 1973, 
Professor Chaffin collected the existing literature on the subject in 1973. See Chaffin, 
supra note 2, at 445 n. 12. 
SUMMER 2009 Estate Taxation of Reversions   333 
UPC section 2-707(b) reverses the NICS rule with respect to trusts, 
but not legal life estates, creating a condition of survival by providing 
that “[a] future interest under the terms of a trust is contingent on the 
beneficiary’s surviving the distribution date.”41 The “distribution date 
. . . means the time when the future interest takes effect in possession or 
enjoyment.”42 When a future interest so fails, subsection (b) creates a 
substitute gift to the pre-deceased beneficiary’s descendants who survive 
the distribution date, but no substitute gift is created for multigeneration-
al class gifts to ‘“issue,’ ‘descendants,’ . . . ‘heirs,’ . . . or a class de-
scribed by language of similar import.”43 A substitute gift in multigenera-
tional class gifts is not necessary because “these types of class gifts have 
their own internal systems of representation.”44 
But making all future interests (including all substitute gifts) contin-
gent on the beneficiary’s surviving to the distribution date creates the 
possibility that all of these conditions will fail, and subsection (d) 
addresses that situation: 
If, after application of subsections (b) and (c), there 
is no surviving taker, the property passes in the follow-
ing order: (1) if the trust was created in a nonresiduary 
devise in the transferor’s will or in a codicil to the trans-
feror’s will, the property passes under the residuary 
clause in the transferor’s will; for purposes of this sec-
tion, the residuary clause is treated as creating a future 
interest under the terms of a trust; (2) if no taker is pro-
duced by the application of paragraph (1), the property 
passes to the transferor’s heirs under section 2‑711.45 
Consequently, it appears that when UPC section 2-707 applies, the 
transferor cannot have a reversion unless the transfer expressly creates it. 
However, as discussed below, some commentators have read it other-
wise.46 
                                                   
41 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 195 (Supp. 2008). 
42 Id. § 2-707(a)(4). The requirement of survival of the distribution date means 
survival of the 120-hour period following the distribution date. Id. § 2-702(a), 2-707 cmt., 
8 U.L.A. at 197. 
43 Id. § 2-707(b)(1) and (2), 8 U.L.A. at 195. 
44 Id. § 2-707 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 198. 
45 Id. § 2-707(d), 8 U.L.A. at 196. 
46 See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
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III.   AN EXPLANATION OF SECTION 2037 
A. The Curious Case of Example 3 of UPC Section 2-707 
The comment to UPC section 2-707 contains examples. Here is one: 
Example 3. G created an irrevocable inter vivos trust, 
income to A for life, remainder in corpus to B if B sur-
vives A. B predeceased A. At A’s death, G and X, B’s 
child, are living. 
Solution: X takes the trust property. Because B’s fu-
ture interest is not in the form of a class gift, subsection 
(b)(1) applies, not (b)(2). Subsection (b)(1) creates a 
substitute gift with respect to B’s future interest; the 
substitute gift is to B’s child, X. Under subsection (b)(3), 
the words of survivorship (“to B if B survives A”) do not 
indicate an intent contrary to the creation of that substi-
tute gift. Nor, under subsection (b)(4), is the substitute 
gift superseded by an alternative future interest; G’s re-
version is not an alternative future interest as defined in 
subsection (a)(1) because it was not expressly created.47 
The last sentence of the solution appears self-contradictory. Under 
the common law, in a transfer “by G to A for life, remainder to B if B 
survives A,” A would have a life estate, B would have a contingent 
remainder, and G would have a reversion. But UPC section 2-707 creates 
a contingent remainder in B, a contingent remainder in B’s descendants 
who survive A, and a contingent remainder in G’s heirs (not in G). Thus, 
the explanation in the comment that “G’s reversion is not an alternative 
future interest as defined in subsection (a)(1) because it was not express-
ly created”48 is odd. If G does not have a reversion because none was 
expressly created, why mention that a nonexistent interest does not 
qualify as an “alternative future interest?” A nonexistent interest does not 
exist, and its nonexistence means that it lacks all qualities, so pointing 
out one quality that it lacks is curious. Or, does the comment mean to 
suggest that we construe the transfer under the common law rule long 
enough to discern a common law reversion, but then immediately declare 
that no reversion exists because it was not expressly created? Apparently 
                                                   
47 Id. § 2-707 cmt. ex. 3, 8 U.L.A. at 199 (emphasis altered). 
48 Id. § 2-707 cmt. ex. 3, 8 U.L.A. 200. A reversion will qualify as an “alternative 
future interest” only if “expressly created.” Id. § 2-707(a)(1), 8 U.L.A. at 194. 
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so, but it is odd to call something a reversion simply to be able to say that 
it is not a reversion. Example 3 arguably leaves open whether G owns a 
reversion when it says that G’s reversion, which should not exist, is not 
an alternative future interest.49 
B. Conflicting Views on Whether UPC Section 2-707 Negates the 
Transferor’s Reversion 
A few years after the adoption of UPC section 2-707, Professor 
Waggoner, its principal drafter,50 and Professor Dukeminier, its principal 
antagonist,51 hotly debated the merits of section 2-707. Mostly they 
debated the wisdom of reversing the NICS rule—Waggoner favored it,52 
and Dukeminier did not, principally because the predeceased remain-
derman lost the ability to direct property to a spouse.53 Dukeminier 
favored the position held by Professor French, namely, that if the NICS 
rule is reversed, and the remainderman’s future interest is made contin-
gent on her survival, the substitute gift arising at the remainderman’s 
death should be a broad special power of appointment in the remainder-
man rather than an automatic gift to the remainderman’s descendants.54 
In addition to disagreeing on the wisdom of keeping the NICS rule, 
Dukeminier and Waggoner also disagreed on whether section 2-707 
negates the settlor’s reversion. Dukeminier argued that UPC section 
2-707 did not negate the settlor’s reversion; Waggoner argued that it did. 
If section 2-707 does not negate the settlor’s reversion, there may be 
negative estate tax results. Dukeminier explained: 
Under section 2-707 of the UPC, which substitutes heirs 
for the reversioner, the reversion is included in the set-
tlor’s federal gross estate according to section 2037 of 
the Internal Revenue Code if the reversion is worth more 
than five percent of the value of the property at the set-
tlor’s death. Indeed, inasmuch as Section 2-707 creates a 
                                                   
49 Because oral trusts are permitted, UNIF. TRUST CODE § 407 (amended 2005), 7C 
U.L.A. 489 (2006), a case might involve whether an oral reversion was expressly created. 
50 See Waggoner, supra note 10, at 2309. 
51 See Dukeminier, supra note 6, at 148. 
52 See Waggoner, supra note 10, at 2313. 
53 See Dukeminier, supra note 6, at 151–52. 
54 See Dukeminier, supra note 6, at 165 (citing Susan F. French, Imposing a General 
Survival Requirement on Beneficiaries of Future Interests: Solving the Problems Caused 
by the Death of a Beneficiary Before the Time Set for Distribution, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 
835–36 (1985)). 
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reversion in the settlor in every case of an irrevocable 
inter vivos trust, unless a contrary intent is shown, there 
is a risk that the settlor’s reversion implied by law will 
be taxable in his estate under Section 2037 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.55 
Waggoner responded: 
His [Dukeminier’s] error occurs when he says that “the 
settlor has a reversion. . . .” Section 2-707 does not give 
the settlor a reversion in that instance or in any other 
circumstance. In effect, what Section 2-707 does is to 
transform the remainder interest [in a transfer by settlor 
in trust for A for life, then to B] from one that is inde-
feasibly vested in B into one in favor of B if B survives 
A, but if not to B’s descendants surviving A, and if none 
to those persons who would be the settlor’s heirs if the 
settlor died when A dies. Under Section 2-707, the prop-
erty would not revert to the settlor even if the settlor sur-
vived A. . . . Dukeminier is quite wrong when he says 
that the property is included in the settlors’s gross estate 
under Section 2037 if the settlor dies before A.56 
Waggoner’s interpretation is a straightforward reading of section 2-
707, and a casebook for which Dukeminier was an author subsequently 
adopted the Waggoner view.57 However, other commentators have 
adopted Dukeminier’s first view that section 2-707 does not negate the 
settlor’s reversion. Professors Pennell and Newman wrote that if the 
predeceased future interest holder is not survived by descendants, “there 
[is] a reversion in the transferor.”58 Professors Featherston and Hatfield 
wrote a problem and a solution that conclude that the settlor of an inter 
vivos trust has a reversion under section 2-707.59 In their answer, Profes-
                                                   
55 Dukeminier, supra note 6, at 157 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
56 Waggoner, supra note 10, at 2343–44 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
57 See DUKEMINIER, JOHANSON, LINDGREN & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 647 
(“[s]ection 2-707 does not permit reversion to the settlor . . . .”). 
58 JEFFERY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, PENNELL AND NEWMAN’S SUM & 
SUBSTANCE QUICK REVIEW OF WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 283 (2007). 
59 See THOMAS M. FEATHERSTON, JR. & MICHAEL HATFIELD, QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS: WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 65, 171 (2d ed. 2008). Problem 164 on page 65 
involves a transfer by Joe in trust for Cindi for life, remainder to Alice and Sam. Alice 
predeceases Cindi. The answer on page 171 says that Sam and Joe are entitled to the trust 
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sors Featherston and Hatfield cited to Professor Averill,60 but Averill 
does not specifically address the issue. Professor Averill’s section 2-707 
discussion cross-references his discussion regarding lapses in wills, 
which cannot completely cover UPC section 2-707 because, as Averill’s 
text notes, UPC section 2-707 “applies both to irrevocable inter vivos 
trusts and to trusts that are created at death.”61 
Dukeminier’s discussion of the estate tax consequences of a rever-
sion in a settlor of an inter vivos trust was a bit imprecise. Dukeminier 
stated, and Waggoner perhaps assumed, that section 2037 would govern 
if section 2-707 did not negate the transferor’s reversion. As later 
discussion will make clear,62 section 2037 would govern only if the 
settlor’s reversion is contingent on the settlor’s surviving until the 
reversion took effect in possession (that is, the reversion, like other 
future interests, is subject to the NICS rule reversal). If the settlor’s 
reversion is not contingent on the settlor’s surviving until possession, 
section 2033 would govern and it does not have a 5% de minimis rule.63 
IV.   NICS RULE REVERSALS NOT NEGATING THE 
TRANSFEROR’S REVERSION 
A. California 
Between 1994 and 2002, California had a statutory regime in place 
that reversed the NICS rule, yet did not negate the transferor’s reversion. 
A 1994 statute reversed the NICS rule by providing that “a transferee 
who fails to survive the transferor or until any future time required by the 
instrument does not take under the instrument.”64 “Instrument” included 
                                                   
estate upon Cindi’s death (when Alice has no then-surviving descendants). That is not 
correct—under UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(d)(2), the trust estate would belong to Sam 
and Joe’s heirs as determined at Cindi’s death. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b) cmt. ex. 
10, 8 U.L.A. 202. A different problem and answer seemingly adopts the Waggoner view; 
that is, problem 145 on page 59 and answer on page 164. 
60 See id. at 171 (citing LAWRENCE H. AVERILL, JR., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A 
NUTSHELL § 11.05, at 253 (5th ed. 2001).). 
61 LAWRENCE H. AVERILL, JR., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL § 11.05, at 
253 (5th ed. 2001). 
62 See infra Section III.E. 
63 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 1 (1958). 
64 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21109(a), 187 (West Supp. 2009) (added by 1994 Cal. Stat. 
ch. 806, § 41); amended by 2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 138, § 18 (quoting statute as originally 
enacted). 
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an inter vivos declaration of trust.65 Another statute provided that the 
descendants of such a predeceased transferee would take a substitute gift, 
provided the transferor and transferee were kin either by blood or 
marriage.66 But no statute addressed to whom the property would pass 
when the transferee predeceased the transferor and no substitute gift 
arose, either because (1) the transferor and transferee were not kin; or (2) 
if kin, the transferee was not survived by descendants. Consequently, 
after the 1994 statute became effective, the transferor of a California 
irrevocable inter vivos trust always owned a reversion unless the instru-
ment (1) overrode the default rule by eliminating the requirement that 
transferees survive until possession, or (2) expressly negated the rever-
sion by providing alternate takers upon failed contingencies. 
In 2002, for reasons unrelated to the transfer taxation of reversions,67 
California limited its NICS rule reversal to transfers taking effect at 
death;68 consequently, irrevocable, inter vivos transfers immediately 
taking effect regained the NICS rule. Thus, after the 2002 amendment 
took effect, California returned to the NICS rule for irrevocable, inter 
vivos transfers. 
By statute, California made all irrevocable, inter vivos trusts created 
between the effective dates of the 1994 and 2002 enactments into Spiegel 
trusts, which meant that the actuarial value of settlor’s reversion at his 
death is included in his federal gross estate under Code section 2033.69 
Consequently, although the included amount might be small, particularly 
when, as is usually the case, the beneficiaries are younger than the settlor 
                                                   
65 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21101 (“[T]his part applies to a will, trust, deed, and any 
other instrument”). 
66 See id. § 21110. 
67 As enacted in 1994, the statute not only reversed the NICS rule, it arguably 
rescinded completed transfers of property when the beneficiary predeceased the donor. 
Professor Cunningham pointed out this anomaly in a 1997 article. See Cunningham, 
supra note 25, at 690–91. The California Law Revision Commission agreed and 
recommended that the statute be amended to limit it to “gifts that remain revocable 
during the lifetime of the donor.” CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 
FOR TRUSTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS, 31 CAL. L. REV. COMM=N REP. 167, 178 (2001), 
available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/REC-RulesConstrTrust.pdf. 
68 Section 21109 now provides, “[a] transferee who fails to survive the transferor of 
an at-death transfer or until any future time required by the instrument does not take 
under the instrument.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 21109(a) (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis 
added). The 2002 amendment added the italicized words. See 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 138, 
§ 18. 
69 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 1 (1958). 
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and there are multiple beneficiaries, the fact of inclusion and its compli-
cated mathematics exist. As well, the gift tax value would be the net of 
the value of the reversion. Negating the settlor’s reversion would have 
cured both problems. 
B. Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers 
§ 11 
The Restatement of Property has long included preferences for early 
vesting and early indefeasibility70 within its multiple rules of construc-
tion and constructional preferences.71 Both constructional preferences 
were dropped from the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers. Instead, the Restatement substitutes a construction 
that “favors family members over non-family members, . . . favors close 
family members over more remote family members, and . . . that does 
not disinherit a line of descent.”72 The Reporter’s Notes make clear that 
these preferences can be achieved by negating the NICS rule, and 
thereby encourages its negation.73 
While the Comments and Reporter’s Notes in the Restatement 
(Third) of Property encourage courts to abandon the NICS rule,74 and 
identify adverse estate tax consequences as a reason to do so, nothing 
alerts a reform-minded court to the difficult transfer tax consequences 
arising when the transferor’s reversion is not negated. Thus, a court 
reversing the NICS rule by common law decision runs the risk of solving 
                                                   
70 See 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 243 cmts. i-j (1940). 
71 The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers 
distinguishes rules of construction and constructional preferences. Rules of construction 
are specific and provide guidance for resolving specific situations or construing specific 
terms. Constructional preferences are general, may overlap, and sometimes conflict. A 
rule of construction is not a mandatory rule of law, but is a default rule designed to carry 
out presumed intent. A rule of construction yields to a finding of a contrary intent. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3(a)–(b) 
cmt. a (2003). 
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 11.3(c)(3) (2003). 
73 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 11.3 reporter’s note 6 (2003). 
74 Professor Waggoner, the principal drafter of Uniform Probate Code section 2-707, 
identifies these developments as creating momentum for section 2-707. See Waggoner, 
supra note 10, at 2321–26. 
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the transferee’s estate tax problem at the expense of the transferor’s. 
Indeed, that occurred in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Beach.75 
C. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Beach 
In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Beach, husband created two inter 
vivos trusts providing income for wife for life, remainder to husband’s 
heirs.76 The Supreme Court of Illinois—citing the critique of the rule of 
early vesting made by Professor Schuyler and calling him an “eminent 
scholar in the field of Illinois future interest law”77—held that the 
donor’s “heirs” were to be determined as of the time of income benefi-
ciary’s death, not earlier at the donor’s death,78 as would be the case 
under the third sub-rule of the traditional rule of early vesting.79 
The matter of the husband’s reversion and its transfer tax conse-
quences were not at issue. If they had been, because the future interest 
was in husband’s heirs, husband would not be regarded to have a 
reversion. A future interest in “heirs” always will have a taker in posses-
sion, because everyone has heirs, to the point of an escheat if no other 
exists. 
However, if the future interest after wife’s life estate were in hus-
band’s “descendants,” then the reversion issue would arise. The court’s 
reasoning for reversing the NICS rule in Beach applies equally to 
interests in descendants: 
The result of delaying a gift to the heirs is not dra-
matic. The fear that a contingent remainder could be 
prematurely destroyed no longer exists. Further, should a 
predeceased member of the class be excluded from the 
gift, the result is not drastic. If the predeceased “heir” 
leaves issue, as is the case here, the settlor’s own blood 
still enjoys the gift. If, on the other hand, a predeceased 
member fails to leave issue, as also occurred here, the 
gift is prevented from falling into the hands of strangers. 
In sum, by altering the degree of proof necessary to de-
                                                   
75 513 N.E.2d 833, 838–39 (Ill. 1987). 
76 See id. at 834–36. The settlor actually created two trusts, but they were, in 
relevant part, identical. “The parties agree that both the 1921 trust and the 1926 trust 
should be distributed in identical manners.” Id. at 835. 
77 Id. at 838. 
78 See id. at 840. 
79 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
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lay the vesting of a gift to the heirs, we do no harm. In-
stead, we further the ordinary grantor’s intent, which is 
exactly what a proper rule of construction ought to do.80 
While the property law result of delaying a gift to heirs (or even to 
descendants) is not dramatic, the effect on the transferor’s tax conse-
quences is. In Beach, if husband had created the future interest in 
descendants, the court’s NICS-rule reversal would have caused hus-
band’s estate to include the value of his reversion in his federal gross 
estate.81 
D. Future Interests that are Single-Generation Class Gifts 
UPC section 2-707 reverses the NICS rule for all future interests in 
trusts. It makes substitute gifts to the descendants of all pre-deceased 
beneficiaries except beneficiaries of multi-generational class gifts. It also 
negates the transferor’s reversion by making the transferor’s heirs, rather 
than the transferor, the ultimate taker in default.82 Thus, under the UPC, 
the NICS rule is reversed for single-generation class gifts. 
Not so for the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of 
Property; they retain the NICS rule for single-generation class gifts. In so 
doing, the Restatement (Second) takes the odd position of disparaging its 
rule. The Restatement (Third) takes a more nuanced view by recognizing 
the limits of a common law reversal of the NICS rule. 
1. Restatement (Second) of Property: Wills and Donative Transfers 
§ 27.3 
Section 27.3 of the Restatement (Second) of Property: Wills and 
Donative Transfers provides default rules of construction when a 
member under a single-generation class gift dies after the effective date 
of the dispositive instrument but before the date of distribution.83 
                                                   
80 Beach, 513 N.E.2d at 840. 
81 Had the gift in Beach been to descendants rather than heirs, Beach would be 
identical to Spiegel. Thus, in Beach, the Illinois Supreme Court created by common law 
presumption the exact unfortunate result that drafting inadvertence had created in Spiegel. 
82 See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
83 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.3(1) (1988) 
(“[A] person within the primary meaning of the class gift term who dies after the 
dispositive instrument takes effect but before such class member is entitled to distribution 
of his or her share is not excluded from the class by reason of such death, if such death 
does not make impossible the fulfillment of a condition, unless additional language or 
circumstances indicate otherwise, or an applicable statute provides otherwise.”). 
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Generally, the NICS rule applies, and the predeceased class member’s 
future interest does not terminate on her death, but passes through her 
estate. However, the commentary describing the rule twice disparages it, 
and argues for its reversal. Comment i recommends statutes that “provide 
that the share of a class member who dies after the date a dispositive 
instrument takes effect and before the date of distribution to the class 
shall go to some specified substitute taker,”84 but of course if such a 
statute did not negate the transferor’s reversion, complicated transfer tax 
issues would arise. The Reporter’s Tax Note to section 27.3 again speaks 
against the NICS rule—by identifying the possibility of estate taxation—
and states “[i]t is undesirable from an estate tax standpoint to allow the 
rule of § 27.3 to apply.”85 
However, while the comment and note recommend reversal of the 
NICS rule, they do not speak to the other half of an effective NICS rule 
reversal—negating the transferor’s reversion. It is undesirable from a gift 
and estate tax standpoint to reverse the NICS rule, but not negate the 
transferor’s reversion. 
2. Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers § 15.4 
Section 15.4 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers retains the NICS rule for beneficiaries of single-
generation class gifts, although that position was opposed by many of the 
reporters, advisers, Consultative Group members, and Council members 
of the American Law Institute.86 
The substantive merit of the NICS rule in this context was debated 
extensively and then voted upon.87 The Reporter and Associate Reporter 
presented the Institute with a choice between two options: (1) retaining 
the common law NICS, or (2) requiring beneficiary survival coupled 
with a substitute gift to the descendants of the predeceased donee.88 They 
did not mention a need to negate the transferor’s reversion. The Ameri-
can Law Institute voted to adopt the traditional option, but by a close 
                                                   
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.3 cmt. i (1988). 
Not addressed is the potential undesirability of a GST tax if the NICS rule is reversed. 
See supra note 9. 
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.3 reporter’s tax 
note (1988). 
86 See 81 A.L.I. PROC. 186 (2004). 
87 See id. 159–93. 
88 See id. at 186–92. 
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vote of fifty-seven to fifty.89 Professor Waggoner explained the position 
of the Reporters: 
The Reporters favored the traditional option because 
they were concerned that courts would be unwilling to 
adopt the antilapse-type option. Doing so would require 
the court to insert a substitute gift based on likely prefe-
rences lacking any foundation in the language of the in-
strument of transfer. The traditional technique of the 
common law is construction, not insertion of a gift that 
does not appear in the language of the document or that 
cannot be implied from the language of the document.90 
The debate encapsulates the difficulties in creating a well-formed 
common law reversal of the NICS rule. Switching a default rule from not 
requiring survival to requiring survival is well within common law 
development. However, addressing collateral consequences is not. To fix 
the first collateral consequence, as noted by Professor Waggoner, a court 
must insert a gift—to a predeceased donee’s descendants—that lacks any 
foundation in the text of the document.91 Yet, if such a substitute gift is 
not implied, then a line of descent is disinherited. The second collateral 
consequence—the reversion arising in the transferor—is even harder to 
correct by traditional common law rules of construction. If beneficiary 
survival is implied by default, a reversion in the transferor necessarily 
arises to take effect in possession if the newly-implied condition of 
survival fails. To negate the reversion, a court would have to imply a 
second substitute gift. The first substitute gift—to a predeceased transfer-
ee’s descendants—at least has a tight connection to the transferee 
expressly designated by the transferor and correlates with the traditional 
rule of antilapse that applies to present gifts under wills. The second 
substitute gift—arising to negate the transferor’s reversion—has neither a 
connection to an expressly designated transferee nor a well-known 
analog. Thus, as demonstrated earlier in this article, if the NICS rule is 
reversed for an inter vivos transfer, a reversion arises. If that reversion is 
not negated, then the transferor has complicated transfer tax conse-
                                                   
89 See id. at 192. 
90 Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of Property, 
33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 993, 1008 (2007) (emphasis added). 
91 See id. 
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quences, both in valuing the gift and in valuing the reversion at the 
transferor’s death.  
E. Summary of NICS-Rule–Reversal Reforms 
The NICS-rule–reversal reforms enacted by statute in California, 
made by judicial decision in Illinois, and suggested by the second and 
third Restatements of Property all fail to negate the transferor’s rever-
sion. This reversion will solve the transferee’s estate tax problem at the 
expense of the transferor, who will now face thorny gift tax and estate 
tax consequences. 
V. DEMONSTRATING THE TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES 
               OF REVERSIONS: I.R.C. SECTIONS 2033, 2037, & 2702 
A. NICS Rule Property Law Consequence: No Reversion 
Under the NICS rule, in the transfer by O “to A for life, remainder to 
B,” B has an indefeasibly vested remainder. Because B’s remainder is 
indefeasibly vested, O, the transferor, does not have any interest in the 
property after the transfer is made because no possibility exists that the 
property can ever return to O. At A’s death, the property is transferred to 
B, to B’s designee, or to the person indicated by the relevant intestacy 
statute (if B predeceased and made no express designation). 
B. NICS Rule Gift Tax Consequence: Completed Gift of Entire 
Property 
The creation of future interests nearly always occurs in transfers that 
are gifts rather than sales. Transfers by O to “A for life, remainder to B” 
rarely involve consideration paid by A or B to O. Typically, O transfers 
the property without consideration; that is, O makes a gift. Gifts are 
subject to an excise tax upon the privilege of giving property away.92 
“[T]he tax is a primary and personal liability of the donor, is an excise 
upon his act of making the transfer, is measured by the value of the 
property passing from the donor, and attaches regardless of the fact that 
the identity of the donee may not then be known or ascertainable.”93 The 
value of the gift is the fair market value of the property at the time of the 
gift.94 If the donor gives away less than his entire interest in property, 
that is, he gives away part and retains part, the value of the gift will equal 
                                                   
92 See I.R.C. § 2501; Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1. 
93 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a). 
94 See I.R.C. § 2512. 
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the value of the property less the value of the part retained.95 When the 
default NICS rule applies, the transferor does not retain any interest in 
the property. The gift tax value will thus be the fair market value of the 
property at the time of the gift, and no issue arises regarding the valua-
tion of the retained part, for none is retained.96 
C. NICS Rule Reversed Property Law Consequence: Reversion? 
In a transfer “to A for life then to B,” the express language does not 
address whether B must survive A in order to take the property at A’s 
death. Section 2-707 of the UPC, adopted in 1990, creates a rule of 
construction that requires B to survive until the future interest takes 
effect in possession.97 Multiple consequences flow from that requirement 
of survival. 
One, B’s remainder now is classified as a contingent remainder.98 
Two, as a contingent remainder, it becomes subject to being invalidated 
by the Rule Against Perpetuities. Three, as a contingent remainder, it 
necessarily creates other property interests that will take effect in 
possession if the survival contingency is not satisfied. If the NICS rule 
simply is reversed, and the reform does no more, then the new interest 
                                                   
95 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (“If a donor transfers by gift less than his entire 
interest in property, the gift tax is applicable to the interest transferred.”). 
96 If the transfer “to A for life remainder to B” was in O’s will, the transfer tax 
consequences would be identical, whether or not a contingency of survival is imposed on 
B. For property to be transferred under O’s will, O must own the property at his death. 
Any such property owned by O at his death is included in his federal gross estate. See 
IRC §§ 2031, 2033. Thus, the entire value is included in O’s federal gross estate whether 
or not the particular transfer makes a complete disposition. If a particular transfer in a 
will is not a complete disposition, O does not retain a reversion that is subtracted from the 
estate valuation—the estate owns the entire property and it is valued as such. Conversely, 
with a lifetime gift, when a particular gift is not a complete disposition, O’s reversion is 
subtracted from the gift valuation (but Code section 2702 often will make that subtracted 
value zero). See id. § 2702. 
97 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 195 (1998) (“[A] 
future interest under a trust is contingent on the beneficiary’s surviving the distribution 
date.”). Section 2-707(a) defines “distribution date” with respect to a future interest to 
mean the time when “the future interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment.” Id. 
§ 2-707(a)(4), 8 U.L.A. at 194. Section 2-702(a) adds 120 hours. See id. § 2-702(a), 8 
U.L.A. at 182. 
98 See id. § 2-707 cmt., 8 U.L.A. at 198 (“Subsection (b) renders a future interest 
‘contingent’ on the beneficiary’s survival of the distribution date. As a result, future 
interests are ‘nonvested’ and subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. To prevent an 
injustice from resulting because of this, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 
which has a wait-and-see element, is incorporated into the Code as Part 9.”). 
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created is a reversion in O, the transferor. Thus, if B is not alive at A’s 
death, the property would revert to O. Some versions of the NICS reform 
do just that—they imply a condition of survival and no more. 
The UPC, on the other hand, does two things in addition to requiring 
survival by B. First, it creates a taker if B’s survival contingency is not 
met—a substitute gift is created in B’s surviving descendants.99 Second, 
it provides that if both the survival contingency and the descendants-
existence contingency are not met, then the property passes to O’s heirs 
as determined at A’s death (unless B’s interest was created in a nonresid-
uary devise in O’s will, in which case the property passes under the 
will’s residuary clause).100 Thus, the UPC’s reversal of the NICS rule 
negates the transferor’s reversion because the property never will revert 
to O.101 
D. NICS Rule Reversed Federal Gift Tax Consequence: Possible 
Incomplete Gift 
The reform of section 2-707 consisted of three elements: (1) revers-
ing the NICS rule, (2) creating a substitute gift in a predeceased taker’s 
descendants, and (3) creating a backstop gift in O’s heirs. A consequence 
of the third element is that when UPC section 2-707 applies, O should 
not be regarded to have a reversion. Thus, the federal transfer tax 
consequences of a transfer “to A for life, remainder to B” should be 
identical whether construed under the common law NICS rule or under 
section 2-707. That is, the gift tax value will be the fair market value of 
the property, and no issue regarding the valuation of the retained part 
arises, for none is retained. 
However, two points need to be made. If a particular reform of the 
NICS rule omits the third element of section 2-707, then O will have a 
reversion. When O retains a reversion, the value of the gift will equal the 
value of the property minus the value of the part retained.102 That will 
cause two separate, but related, transfer tax issues. First, valuing the 
reversion will be complicated by complex survival contingency probabil-
ities and survival time requirements.103 Second, the existence of a 
                                                   
99 See id. § 2-707(b)(1), 8 U.L.A. at 195. 
100 See id. § 2-707(d), 8 U.L.A. at 196. 
101 See id. § 2-707(d)(2), 8 U.L.A. at 196–197; id. § 2-711, 8 U.L.A. at 205. 
102 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e). 
103 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 182 (1998). 
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reversion in O may cause the property to be included in O’s federal gross 
estate at O’s death. 
E. NICS Rule Reversed Federal Estate Tax Consequence: Reversion 
Surviving Settlor’s Death (Section 2033) or Reversion Terminating 
at Settlor’s Death (Section 2037) 
Whether O’s reversion is taxable under Code section 2033 or 2037 
will depend on whether the reversion exists beyond or terminates upon 
O’s death.104 That can be thought of as a question of whether the NICS 
rule reversal also reverses the NICS rule as applied to the reversion. If 
the reversion is subject to the NICS rule reversal (that is, O’s reversion 
extinguishes at her death unless it earlier became possessory), Code 
section 2037 provides the parameters for inclusion in O’s estate (includ-
ing its 5% de minimis rule). If the reversion is not subject to the NICS 
rule reversal (that is, O’s reversion survives her own death), then Code 
section 2033 governs inclusion (and does not have a 5% de minimis 
rule).105 
Authorities construing Code section 2037 are scant, and none com-
prehensively describe its operation. The Internal Revenue Service’s (the 
“Service’s”) most comprehensive ruling unhelpfully alludes to “secret 
knowledge.”106 Understanding Code section 2037 requires understanding 
multiple difficult areas: (1) the property law of future interests; (2) the 
property law related to reversions, which are a particular type of future 
interest; (3) time-value-of-money concepts as applied to calculating the 
                                                   
104 See Rev. Rul. 55-438, 1955-2 C.B. 601 (providing that possibility of reverter 
obliterated at decedent’s death not included by predecessor of Code section 2033). The 
requirement for Code section 2037 to apply “may be restated a different way that is a bit 
more understandable: Does death terminate the grantor’s reversion? Neither the Code nor 
Regulations phrase this requirement in this manner, but is has the same effect.” IRA 
MARK BLOOM, F. LADSON BOYLE, JOHN T. GAUBATZ & LEWIS D. SOLOMON, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS 371 (rev. 3d ed. 2003). 
105 See Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324 (Inclusion under Code section 2033 
occurs if “the decedent owns any beneficial interest in a trust which survives his 
death . . . .”). 
106 Rev. Rul. 76-178, 1976-1 C.B. 273; see infra note 127. The treatises are not 
much help either, beyond suggesting the hiring of actuaries. See 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 524.6 [2], at 41C76 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000) 
(“Unless the attorney is comfortable with actuarial computations, it may be worthwhile to 
engage the services of an actuary in estimating the value of the reversionary interest.”). 
Few secondary materials exist to help attorneys become comfortable with actuarial 
computations. 
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present value of future interests; (4) the elements of probability theory; 
and (5) life contingency actuarial mathematics. 
VI.    AN EXPLANATION OF CODE SECTION 2037 
Code section 2037, reduced to its operative minimum, provides as 
follows: the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property of which the decedent has made a transfer if (1) possession of 
the property can be obtained only by surviving the decedent, (2) the 
decedent retained a reversionary interest in the property, and (3) the 
value of that reversionary interest exceeds five percent of the value of the 
property to which the reversionary interest relates immediately before the 
death of the decedent.107 
Code section 2037 is triggered when decedent has transferred an in-
terest in property to another and possession under that transferred 
interest can be obtained only by surviving the decedent.108 We can call 
that interest the “Section-2037-triggering interest.” Thus, the first step in 
a section 2037 analysis is to examine all transfers made by a decedent 
prior to her death; classify all interests created by those transfers; and ask 
with respect to each interest: Can possession under that interest be 
obtained only by surviving the decedent? Any interest for which the 
answer is yes triggers a further analysis under Code section 2037. 
In classifying property interests as section-2037-triggering interests, 
we necessarily must consider when property interests might take effect in 
possession, which places us squarely within the property law of future 
interests. Whenever a person owns an interest in property, yet that 
interest does not include the right to present possession, we call that 
property interest a future interest.109 
A few examples help clarify this analysis: 
Case 1. O, while living, transfers $750,000 to an ir-
revocable trust, to pay income to W for her life, re-
mainder to O or O’s estate. At O’s death at age seventy-
eight, the trust principal is worth $1 million, and W is 
age eighty-one. 
                                                   
107 See I.R.C. § 2037. 
108 See id. 
109 See supra note 1. Interestingly, the Uniform Probate Code comprehensively 
addresses future interests without defining them. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(a)(5) 
(amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. (1998) (“‘Future interest’ includes an alternative future 
interest and a future interest in the form of a class gift.”). 
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At the time of the grant, the only interest transferred by O was the 
life estate to W. Can W obtain W’s life estate only by surviving O? No, W 
could, and did, possess W’s life estate while O was alive. Consequently, 
there is no section-2037-triggering interest, and Code section 2037 does 
not apply. 
However, because O’s reversion extends beyond O’s death, the re-
version is property “of the decedent at the time of his death,”110 and is 
included in O’s federal gross estate.111 The amount included is the value 
of the remainder after W’s life estate,112 which, given W’s age of eighty-
one and assuming a 6% rate of interest, is 0.66113 times $1,000,000, 
which equals $660,000. 
Case 2. O, while living, transfers $750,000 to an ir-
revocable trust, to pay income to W for her life, re-
mainder to O if O is living, and if not, to Daughter or 
Daughter’s estate. At O’s death at age seventy-eight, the 
trust principal is worth $1 million, W is age eighty-one, 
and Daughter is age sixty. 
At the time of the grant, O transferred (1) a life estate to W, and (2) a 
contingent remainder to Daughter.114 For each interest, we ask: Can 
                                                   
110 I.R.C. § 2033. 
111 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 1 (1958). 
112 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(2)(ii) (“If the interest to be valued is to take 
effect after a definite number of years or after the death of one individual, the present 
value of the interest is computed by multiplying the value of the property by the 
appropriate remainder interest actuarial factor (that corresponds to the applicable section 
7520 interest rate and remainder interest period) in Table B (for a term certain) or the 
appropriate Table S (for one measuring life), as the case may be.”); Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2031-7(d)(5), ex. 1. 
113 Code section 7520 states: 
[T]he value of any annuity, any interest for life or a term of years, or any 
remainder or reversionary interest shall be determined—(1) under tables 
prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury], and (2) by using an interest 
rate (rounded to the nearest 2/10ths of 1 percent) equal to 120 percent of 
the Federal midterm rate in effect under section 1274(d)(1) for the month 
in which the valuation date falls. 
I.R.C. § 7520. The referenced rate is called the “Section 7520 rate” and is published 
monthly by the Service. The Treasury Regulations publish Table S “Single Life 
Remainder Factors.” See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d). For age eighty-one and 6%, Table S 
provides a remainder factor of .65933. See id. For all valuations made in this article, a 
section 7520 rate of 6% was used. 
114 See DOBRIS, STERK & LESLIE, supra note 1, at 788 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 108 (4th ed. 1942)). 
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possession of the property be obtained only by surviving O? First, can W 
obtain possession under W’s life estate only by surviving O? No. Second, 
can Daughter obtain possession under Daughter’s contingent remainder 
only by surviving O? Yes. Therefore, Daughter’s contingent remainder is 
a section-2037-triggering interest. Next, we value O’s reversion as of the 
moment immediately before his death and without regard to the fact of 
the decedent’s death.115 If that value exceeds five percent of the value of 
the trust corpus,116 then the value of Daughter’s contingent remainder as 
of the moment immediately after O’s death is includible in O’s federal 
gross estate.117 That “immediately after” value is the value of the trust 
corpus less the value of W’s life estate, both valued as of the moment 
immediately after O’s death.118 
Case 2 is taken from example 3 of Treasury Regulation section 
20.2037-l(e), and the paragraph above includes the entire analysis set 
forth in the Regulation.119 Missing is any description of how to value the 
decedent’s reversionary interest immediately before his death. We are 
only told that if such value exceeds 5%, then Code section 2037 causes 
an inclusion in decedent’s federal gross estate. To fill in the details, and 
particularly to decide how to value O’s reversion, we must employ 
elements of probability theory. 
Examining the property interests created in Case 2, we see that when 
W’s life estate ends (at W’s death), one of two possibilities will occur: the 
property will pass to O if O is living or to Daughter or Daughter’s 
                                                   
115 See I.R.C. § 2037(b)(2). See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(c)(3) (1958) (“The value is 
ascertained in accordance with recognized valuation principles for determining the value 
for estate tax purposes of future or conditional interests in property. (See § 20.2031B1, 
20.2031B7, and 20.2031B9).”). The noted Code-section-2031-valuation provisions 
reference IRS PUBLICATION 1457, ACTUARIAL VALUES, BOOK ALEPH (July 1999), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1457_99.pdf. See Treas. Reg. § 20-2031-
7(d)(4) (2000). 
116 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(c)(4) (1958) (“For example, assume that the 
decedent, A, transferred property in trust with the income payable to B for life and with 
the remainder payable to C if A predeceases B, but with the property to revert to A if B 
predeceases A. Assume further that A does, in fact, predecease B. The value of A’s 
reversionary interest immediately before his death is compared with the value of the trust 
corpus, without deduction of the value of B’s outstanding life estate.”). 
117 See id. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 4 (1958). 
118 As determined in Case 1, the value of the remainder after W’s life estate is 
$660,000, so Code section 2037 includes $660,000 in O’s federal gross estate in Case 2. 
119 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 4 (1958). 
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successors if O does not survive W.120 Numerous points become clear: 
First, from case 1 we know that when W is age eighty-one, the value of a 
remainder in $1 million of property after W’s life estate is $660,000. 
Second, when W is alive and O is alive, ownership of the remainder is 
split between O and Daughter. Third, when O is alive and W is alive, the 
value of O’s interest in the remainder equals the remainder’s value 
($660,000) multiplied by the probability that O will survive W, and the 
value of Daughter’s interest equals the remainder’s value multiplied by 
the probability that O will not survive W. Fourth, we can calculate the 
probability that O will survive W using life contingency actuarial 
mathematics and mortality data published by the Service.121 Using those 
mathematics and that data, the probability that O, age seventy-eight, will 
survive W, age eighty-one, equals 0.57.122 Fifth, the value of the dece-
dent’s reversionary interest immediately before his death equals the 
remainder value times the probability that O will survive W, or, as we 
now know those figures, $660,000 multiplied by 0.57, which equals 
$376,200. Sixth, the value of O’s reversion immediately before his death 
($376,200) exceeds 5% of the value of the property at O’s death 
($50,000 = $1,000,000 times 0.05). Seventh, because the 5% amount has 
been exceeded, Code section 2037 includes the value of the section-
2037-triggering interest determined immediately after O’s death.123 The 
section-2037-triggering interest is Daughter’s contingent remainder, and 
after O’s death, Daughter’s contingent remainder becomes an indefeasi-
bly vested remainder worth $660,000. 
The amount included under Code section 2037 is the value of the 
section-2037-triggering interest valued immediately after O’s death 
                                                   
120 That, of course, assumes the inapplicability of the doctrine of destructibility of 
contingent remainders, which is true of virtually all states in the United States. See 
Gallanis, supra note 31, at 530–32. If the destructibility doctrine applied, we would have 
to consider a third possibility—that Daughter’s contingent remainder was destroyed in 
the period between the grant and W’s death, in which case, O’s reversion would take 
effect in possession. 
121 See IRS PUBLICATION 1457, ACTUARIAL VALUES, BOOK ALEPH 866 (July 1999), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1457_99.pdf, which includes a mortality 
table labeled “Table 90CM.” Using that table and life contingency actuarial mathematics, 
we can calculate the probability that one individual will survive another. Appendix A of 
this article describes the method. 
122 Using the method described in Appendix A, the probability that y age 81 
survives x age 78 is .43, rounded to two significant figures. The probability that x age 78 
survives y age 81 is 1 -.43 = .57. See infra Appendix A. 
123 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 4 (1958). 
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($660,000); it is not the value of O’s reversion immediately before O’s 
death ($376,200), as the latter value is relevant only in applying the 5% 
threshold test. Code section 2037 therefore always includes an amount 
greater than the value of O’s reversion immediately before O’s death.124 
Note that in Case 2, Code section 2037 includes $660,000 in O’s federal 
gross estate, which is identical to the amount that Code section 2033 
includes in O’s federal gross estate in Case 1. 
Comparing Cases 1 and 2 shows that the amount included in O’s 
federal gross estate is identical in both cases ($660,000), which demon-
strates that Code section 2037 is, at its core, an anti-avoidance provision. 
In Case 1, when O retains a reversion that is a remainder following his 
wife’s life estate, and O dies while W is alive, O’s federal gross estate 
includes the value of the remainder (calculated based on W’s age at O’s 
death). If O merely adds the words “if living” to his reversion, and 
thereby makes his possession under the reversion contingent upon O’s 
surviving W, Code section 2033 would include nothing in O’s estate;125 
                                                   
124 To calculate the value of O’s reversion immediately before O’s death, we 
calculate the present value of the thing that O will receive if he survives and multiply it 
by the probability that O survives. A probability always is less than 1. Thus, the before-
O’s-death value of O’s reversion always is less than the value of thing, because the value 
of thing has been multiplied by a number less than one. 
The section-2037-triggering interest names who takes thing if O does not survive. 
Before O’s death the value of the section-2037-triggering interest equals the value of 
thing times the probability that O will not survive. After O’s death, the value of the 
section-2037-triggering interest is the value of thing (undiminished by survival 
probabilities because we now know that O did not survive). Hence, the value of thing, 
which is the section 2037 inclusion amount, always exceeds the value of O’s reversion—
calculated immediately before O’s death—because that value is the value of thing times a 
number less than one. Therefore, when section 2037 causes an inclusion, section 2037 
always includes an amount greater than the value of O’s reversion immediately before 
O’s death. 
To put it another way, when both are valued before O’s death, the value of O’s 
reversion plus the value of the triggering interest equals the value of thing (the proportion 
between them being precisely the probability of O’s survival). After O’s death, the value 
of O’s reversion is zero and the value of the triggering interest is the value of thing. The 
value of O’s reversion before death is always less than the value of thing; the section 
2037 inclusion amount always is the value of thing; the former always is less than the 
latter. 
125 See Rev. Rul. 55-438, 1955-2 C.B. 601. 
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Code section 2037 obviates this obvious estate tax avoidance technique 
by rendering identical results in Cases 1 and 2.126 
From a non-estate-tax perspective, Cases 1 and 2 are identical. In 
Case 2, O has described in one conveyance—the trust—who will possess 
his reversion if he fails to survive W; in Case 1, O has described in two 
documents—the trust instrument creating his reversion and a will 
devising it—to whom his reversion goes. Cases 1 and 2 ought to be taxed 
identically, and they are, subject to the five percent de minimis rule in 
Code section 2037. 
A. A Four-Step Method to Analyze Section-2037 Situations 
Observations from Cases 1 and 2 permit the development of a four-
step method to analyze section-2037 situations: 
Step One. Examine all transfers made by decedent (O) and classify all 
interests created by such transfers. 
Step Two. With respect to each interest, determine whether possession of 
the property to which the interest relates can be obtained only by 
surviving O. Any such interest triggers application of Code section 2037 
and can be called a section-2037-triggering interest. Multiple section-
2037-triggering interests can exist within a single transfer. 
Step Three. If section 2037 is triggered, value O’s reversion as it existed 
immediately before O’s death and determine if that value exceeds five 
percent of the value of the trust corpus immediately before O’s death. 
Remember that O’s reversion is a separate property interest from the 
section-2037-triggering interest. Probability theory must be used because 
O’s reversionary interest immediately before O’s death necessarily will 
be contingent on O’s survival, for that is what triggers Code section 
2037. In addition, time value of money concepts nearly always will be 
required. If the value of O’s reversionary interest exceeds five percent of 
the value of the trust corpus immediately before O’s death, go to Step 
Four; if not, stop, for there is no section-2037 inclusion. 
                                                   
126 Note that the results in Cases 1 and 2 would not be identical if the value of O’s 
reversionary interest immediately before his death was less than 5% of the trust corpus. 
In that case, nothing would be included in O’s federal gross estate pursuant to section 
2037. The comparison illustrates that while Code section 2037 has a 5% de minimis rule, 
Code section 2033 does not. Case 5 infra illustrates a situation in which the value of a 
reversionary interest valued immediately before death is less than 5% of the trust corpus. 
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Step Four. Value the section-2037-triggering interests as they exist 
immediately after O’s death and include that value in O’s federal gross 
estate. The section-2037-triggering interest(s) were determined in Step 
Two. 
While probability theory must be considered in Step Four, as it must 
in Step Three, one probability term will drop out of the valuation process 
in Step Four as compared to Step Three. In Step Three, the value of O’s 
reversion immediately before O’s death will necessarily reflect the 
probability of O’s survival; however, in Step Four, when valuing the 
section-2037-triggering interests immediately after O’s death, O’s death 
has occurred so the value of those triggering interests at that time no 
longer is reduced by the possibility that O might survive and thereby 
cause the triggering interests to fail. 
For instance, in Case 2 the 57% probability that O would survive W 
(calculated immediately before O’s death) is used to value O’s reversion 
immediately before O’s death and to value the contingent remainder in 
Daughter immediately before O’s death. Thus, while Daughter’s future 
interest was worth 43% of the remainder immediately before O’s death, 
it is worth 100% of the remainder when valued after O’s death, and it is 
the after-death amount that is included in O’s gross estate. That is, after 
O’s death, the divesting condition to which Daughter’s future interest 
was subject has ended. After O’s death, the remainder in Daughter is 
indefeasibly vested, and its value then is the full value of the remainder 
following W’s life estate. 
Case 2 illustrates that probability theory and life contingency actuar-
ial mathematics are central to the calculations required under Code 
sections 2033 and 2037. Surprisingly, no case law, administrative 
pronouncement, or commentary instructs people how to make such 
calculations. This Article fills that gap, and begins by generally explain-
ing probability theory and life contingency actuarial mathematics. 
B. Probability Theory and Life Contingency Actuarial Mathematics 
This Article focuses on inclusion of the value of a reversion in a de-
cedent’s federal gross estate, both when the decedent’s reversion extin-
guishes at death and passes under the instrument creating the reversion 
(Code section 2037), and when the reversion remains extant at death and 
passes under the decedent’s will or intestacy (Code section 2033). The 
valuation of a reversion under Code section 2033 nearly always depends 
upon calculating the probability that persons survive each other, and the 
valuation of a reversion under Code section 2037 valuations always 
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depend upon the probability that the decedent survives another person. 
Thus, determining the probability that one person will survive another is 
vital to valuations required under these two sections. Existing administra-
tive pronouncements treat the matter as opaque—determinable only by 
special request to the Service.127 
Determining how to value interests conditioned on survival, while 
perhaps not obvious, is not opaque. The estate valuation provisions of the 
Treasury Regulations require use of Table 90CM to value all interests 
dependent upon the termination of a life interest.128 Table 90CM is 
published in the Treasury Regulations and is a life table based on the 
1990 United States Census.129 The Treasury Regulations also refer the 
                                                   
127 Rev. Rul. 76-178, 1976-1 C.B. 273, squarely addresses valuation of a reversion 
under Code section 2037 and summarily concludes: 
The decedent’s reversionary interest is described as the present 
worth of the right of the decedent (a male aged 88) to receive 
$100,000 upon the death of A (a female aged 88), provided the 
decedent survives. The actuarial factor representing this described 
reversionary interest is 0.43194. (This factor cannot be found in the 
tables contained in section 20.2031-10(f) of the regulations. Rather, it 
is a special factor that will be computed by the National Office upon 
submission of the information specified in section 20.2031-10(f) of 
the regulations.) 
The examples in the Treasury Regulations under Code section 2037 are even less 
helpful. They merely restate the rule of the statute, without an explanation of how to 
make the calculation. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 3 (1958) (“[i]f the decedent’s 
reversionary interest immediately before his death exceeded 5 percent of the value of the 
property, the value of the property, less the value of the wife’s outstanding life estate, is 
includible in the decedent’s gross estate.”). 
128 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) (2000). During the printing of this Article, the 
Treasury Regulations were amended “to reflect the most recent mortality experience 
available,” as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7520(d)(3), and such mortality data now is 
contained in Table 2000 CM. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7T(d)(7) (2009); see T.D. 9448, 
2009-20 I.R.B. 942 (May 7, 2009), which is the Treasury Decision publishing the 
amendments to the regulations. The Table 2000 CM data is effective for valuation dates 
on or after May 1, 2009. See Treas. Reg. § 20-2031-7T(c) (2009). While the May 2009 
amendments make changes to factors in tables, they make no substantive change to the 
examples or to the valuation mechanisms. Consequently, the examples in the text refer to 
Table 90 CM data; however, all valuation mechanisms remain valid. For later valuation 
dates on or after May 1, 2009, simply substitute the values from the revised tables. 
129 See Treas. Reg. 20.7520-1(b)(2) (2000); see Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-1T(b)(2) 
(2009) (requiring Table 2000 CM for valuation dates on or after May 1, 2009). A life 
table is not constructed by observing 100,000 babies until the last survivor dies. Rather, it 
is based on estimates of death rates derived from the experience of the entire United 
States population in the years around the 1990 census. See NEWTON L. BOWERS, JR., 
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reader to Internal Revenue Service Publication 1457 (which includes 
hundreds of pages of remainder factors), and those regulations indicate 
that Publication 1457 includes examples illustrating how to compute 
“many special factors for more unusual situations.”130 Among other 
things, the examples in Publication 1457 demonstrate how to use Table 
90CM to calculate the probability that a person will survive a period of 
time,131 but no example in Publication 1457 shows how to calculate the 
probability that one person will survive another person. 
The Treasury Regulations state that when the Regulations are silent 
as to an actuarial method, the reader should contact the Service: 
If a special factor is required in the case of an actual de-
cedent, the Internal Revenue Service may furnish the 
factor to the executor upon a request for a ruling. The 
request for a ruling must be accompanied by a recitation 
of the facts including a statement of the date of birth for 
each measuring life, the date of the decedent’s death, any 
other applicable dates, and a copy of the will, trust, or 
other relevant documents. A request for a ruling must 
comply with the instructions for requesting a ruling pub-
lished periodically in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (see 
§§ 601.201 and 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b) of this chapter) and 
include payment of the required user fee.132 
Obviously, in planning situations—those not involving an actual de-
cedent—a request to the Service is not possible. Opacity is unwelcome 
here, and the planning lawyer should be able to resort to something other 
than hiring experts or waiting for an “actual decedent” before requesting 
a ruling from the Service. 
                                                   
HANS U. GERBER, JAMES C. HICKMAN, DONALD A. JONES, CECIL J. NESBITT, ACTUARIAL 
MATHEMATICS 59 (2d ed. 1997). 
130 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(4) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7T(d)(4) (2009). 
131 See IRS Publication 1457 Actuarial Values Book Aleph at vii, example 13 (Rev. 
7-1999). “The probability that a person age 21 will be alive at age 30 is 0.988261 [sic], 
determined as follows: lx value, Table 90CM, page 866, age 30 = 97070[;] lx value, Table 
90CM, age 21 = 98113[;] Required probability = 97070 ÷ 98113 = 0.98937.” You will 
note the typographical error: 0.988261 should be 0.98937. Publication 1457 was updated 
in May 2009 to reflect Table 2000 CM data. The valuation mechanism remained 
identical. The typographical error was not repeated. See IRS Publication 1457 Actuarial 
Valuations Version 3A at 10, example 13 (Rev. 5-2009). 
132 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(4) (2000); See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7T(d)(4) 
(2009). 
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Fortunately, actuarial mathematics are available to provide a formula 
for the solution, notwithstanding the absence of discussion of actuarial 
mathematics in the relevant bodies of law and legal literature. The 
algorithm for the solution involves thousands of multiplications of five 
digit numbers, which at one time was tedious. Today, readily available 
spreadsheet programs can easily make the calculations. The precise 
procedure for calculating the probability that y survives x is provided in 
Appendix A to this article. 
C. Cases to Demonstrate the Four-Step Method to Analyze 
Section-2037-Situations 
Case 3. The decedent transferred property in trust 
with the income payable to his wife for life and with the 
remainder payable to his son or, if the son is not living at 
the wife’s death, to the decedent or, if the decedent is not 
then living, to X or X’s estate. Assume that the decedent 
was survived by his wife, his son, and X.133 
Case 3 is example 4 of Treasury Regulations Section 20.2037-1(e). 
The Regulation provides the following answer: 
Only X cannot obtain possession or enjoyment of the 
property without surviving the decedent. Therefore, if 
the decedent’s reversion immediately before his death 
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the property, the val-
ue of X’s remainder interest (with reference to the time 
immediately after the decedent’s death) is includible in 
the decedent’s gross estate.134 
The Regulation does not attempt to describe in words, much less in 
calculations, how one calculates either the “immediately before” value of 
the reversion or the “immediately after” value of the section-2037-
triggering interest. I will analyze Case 3 using the four-step method 
developed in this article, adding some property values and ages to permit 
numeric calculations, and call it Case 4: 
Case 4. O, while living, transfers $750,000 to an ir-
revocable trust to pay income to W for life, remainder to 
Son, if living, and if not, to O, if living, and if not, to X 
                                                   
133 Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e), ex. 4 (1958). 
134 Id. (emphasis added). 
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or X’s estate. At O’s death at age seventy-eight, the trust 
property is worth $1 million, W is age eighty-one, and 
Son is age sixty. 
Step One. Examine all transfers made by a decedent (O) and classify all 
interests created by such transfers. 
At the grant, O created a life estate in W, a contingent remainder in 
Son, and a contingent remainder in X. 
Step Two. With respect to each interest, determine whether possession of 
the property to which the interest relates can be obtained only by 
surviving O. 
Can W obtain possession under her life estate only by surviving the 
decedent? No, W obtained possession upon the transfer. 
Can Son obtain possession under his contingent remainder only by 
surviving the decedent? No, Son’s contingent remainder can take effect 
in possession while O is alive. If Son survives W, and O is alive, Son’s 
contingent remainder nonetheless takes effect in possession. 
Can X obtain possession under X’s contingent remainder only by 
surviving the decedent? Yes. There is no way for X’s contingent re-
mainder to take effect in possession other than by surviving O. There-
fore, X’s contingent remainder is a section-2037-triggering interest. 
Step Three. If section 2037 is triggered, value O’s reversion as it existed 
immediately before O’s death and determine if that value exceeds five 
percent of the value of the trust corpus immediately before O’s death. 
Immediately before O’s death, the remainder is worth $660,000 (be-
cause W is age eighty-one) and that remainder is split into three pieces. 
On W’s death, (i) Son takes if living, (ii) O takes if Son is dead and O is 
living, and (iii) X takes if Son is dead and O is dead. 
We can value each piece as follows: (Note that the only value rele-
vant to Code section 2037’s application is O’s reversion; however, for 
completeness, all three are valued.) 
Piece One: Immediately before O’s death, Son’s contingent remaind-
er is worth $660,000 multiplied by the probability that Son survives W. 
That probability is 0.86,135 so Son’s remainder is worth $567,600. 
Piece Two: Immediately before O’s, death O’s reversion is worth 
$660,000 multiplied by the probability that W survives Son multiplied by 
                                                   
135 Under the method described in Appendix A, the probability that a person age 
sixty survives a person age eighty-one is 0.86. 
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the probability that O survives W.136 The first probability is 0.14 and the 
second probability is 0.57.137 Thus, O’s reversion is worth $52,668 
($660,000 times 0.14 times 0.57). 
Piece Three: Immediately before O’s death, X’s contingent remaind-
er is worth $660,000 multiplied by the probability that W survives Son 
multiplied by the probability that W survives O, or $39,732 ($660,000 
times 0.14 times 0.43).138 
The value of the trust property at O’s death is $1 million, and 5% of 
that amount is $50,000. Accordingly, the value of O’s reversion 
($52,668) exceeds the 5% threshold, and an inclusion under Code section 
2037 will occur. 
Step Four. Value the section-2037-triggering interests as they exist 
immediately after O’s death and include that value in O’s federal gross 
estate. 
The only section-2037-triggering interest is X’s contingent remainder 
interest. Immediately after O’s death, X’s remainder is contingent only 
on W surviving Son. (Prior to O’s death, X’s remainder was contingent 
on W surviving both Son and O. The latter contingency was removed by 
O’s death). After O’s death, the value of X’s contingent remainder equals 
the value of the remainder after W’s life estate multiplied by the proba-
bility that W will survive Son. That probability is 0.14, and the amount 
included in O’s federal gross estate under section 2037 is $92,400 
($660,000 times 0.14). 
Some observations on the valuation mechanism in Case 4. 
For the values determined with reference to the time immediately 
before O’s death, the $660,000 remainder value is split into three pieces 
with values of $567,600; $52,668; and $39,732. Because piece two (O’s 
reversion) exceeds 5% of the value of the trust at O’s death, Step Four 
                                                   
136 See ALLAN G. BLUMAN, PROBABILITY DEMYSTIFIED 58 (2005) (Multiplication 
Rule I). 
137 Under the method described in Appendix A, the probability that a person age 
eighty-one survives a person age sixty is 0.14; and the probability that a person age 
seventy-eight survives a person age eighty-one is 0.57. 
138 Careful observation reveals that the amount included in Step Four is identical to 
the amount calculated in the first step of Step Three. That is, immediately before O’s 
death, O’s reversion is worth what he would get—a remainder after W’s life estate—
multiplied by the probability that he would get it. In Step Four, that probability is 
eliminated, so the value passing under the section-2037-triggering interest is the value of 
the remainder. Simply put, Step Three discounts O’s reversion by the probability of O’s 
surviving; Step Four does not consider it because we are valuing the section-2037-
triggering interest after O has died. 
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provides that Code section 2037 includes the value of pieces two and 
three. That again shows that when Code section 2037 applies, it includes 
an amount greater than the value of O’s reversion immediately before 
death, but the amount included is identical to what Code section 2033 
would have included had O’s reversion not been contingent on O’s 
survival. Thus, the equality of treatment of identical transactions is 
preserved (provided, of course, the value of piece two exceeds the 5% 
threshold). 
One final case to demonstrate all the points of a Code-section-2037 
analysis: 
Case 5. O, while living, transfers $750,000 to an ir-
revocable trust to pay income to W for life, remainder to 
Son, if living, and if not, to Nephew, if living, and if not, 
to O, if living, and if not, to X or X’s estate. At O’s death 
at age seventy-eight, the trust property is worth $1 mil-
lion. W is age eighty-one, Son is age sixty, and Nephew 
is age fifty. 
Step One. Examine all transfers made by decedent (O) and classify all 
interests created by such transfers. 
At the grant, O created a life estate in W, a contingent remainder in 
Son, a contingent remainder in Nephew, and a contingent remainder in X. 
Step Two. With respect to each interest, determine whether possession of 
the property to which the interest relates can be obtained only by 
surviving O. 
X’s contingent remainder is a section-2037-triggering interest be-
cause possession under that interest can be obtained only by surviving O. 
The same is not true with respect to the other interests. W’s life estate, 
Son’s contingent remainder, and Nephew’s contingent remainder can 
generate a right to present possession of the trust property while O is 
alive. 
Step Three. If section 2037 is triggered, value O’s reversion as it existed 
immediately before O’s death and determine if that value exceeds five 
percent of the value of the trust corpus immediately before O’s death. 
Immediately before O’s death, the remainder is worth $660,000 and 
that remainder is split into four pieces because on W’s death: (i) Son 
takes if living; (ii) Nephew takes if Son is dead, and Nephew is living; 
(iii) O takes if Son is dead, Nephew is dead, and O is living; and (iv) X 
takes if Son is dead, Nephew is dead, and O is dead. 
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Piece One: Immediately before O’s death, Son’s contingent remaind-
er is worth $660,000 multiplied by the probability that Son, age sixty, 
survives W, age eighty-one. Son’s remainder is worth $567,600 
($660,000 times 0.86). 
Piece Two: Immediately before O’s death, Nephew’s contingent re-
mainder is worth $660,000 multiplied by the probability that W, age 
eighty-one, survives Son, age sixty, multiplied by the probability that 
Nephew, age fifty, survives W, age eighty-one. Nephew’s remainder is 
worth $86,856 ($660,000 times 0.14 times 0.94). 
Piece Three: Immediately before O’s death, O’s reversion is worth 
$660,000 multiplied by the probability that W, age eighty-one, survives 
Son, age sixty, multiplied by the probability that W, age eighty-one, 
survives Nephew, age fifty, multiplied by the probability that O, age 
seventy-eight, survives W, age eighty-one. O’s reversion is worth $3,160 
($660,000 times 0.14 times 0.06 times 0.57). 
Piece Four. Immediately before O’s death, X’s contingent remainder 
is worth $660,000 multiplied by the probability that W, age eighty-one 
survives Son, age sixty, multiplied by the probability that W, age eighty-
one, survives Nephew, age fifty, multiplied by the probability that W, age 
eighty-one, survives O, age seventy-eight. O’s reversion is worth $2,384 
($660,000 times 0.14 times 0.06 times 0.43). 
The value of the trust property at O’s death is $1 million, and 5% of 
that amount is $50,000. The 5% value is not exceeded, and no inclusion 
under Code section 2037 occurs. 
Step Four. Value the section-2037-triggering interests as they exist 
immediately after O’s death and include that value in O’s federal gross 
estate. 
Step Four is not necessary because the 5% threshold was not ex-
ceeded. 
Observations on Case 5. 
Here is a tabular summary of the values of the future interests imme-
diately before O’s death: 
Piece 
Number 
Future Interest 
Owner 
Multiplication Terms 
for Valuing 
the Future Interest 
Future 
Interest 
Value 
One Son $660,000 * 0.86 $567,600 
Two Nephew $660,000 * 0.14 * 0.94 $86,856 
Three O $660,000 * 0.14 * 0.06 * 0.57 $3,160 
Four X $660,000 * 0.14 * 0.06 * 0.43 $2,384 
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Probability theory divides the interests in a manner akin to the flow 
of liquid in a pipe or of sap in a tree, and such a division often is called a 
probability tree.139 Piece one has an 86% probability of capturing the 
total remainder, and the remaining 14% probability continues on. Piece 
two has a 94% probability of capturing that remaining 14% piece (a 
13.2% probability of capturing the total remainder), and the remaining 
6% probability of capturing that 14% piece continues on (0.84% of the 
total remainder). Piece three has a 57% chance of capturing that 0.84% 
and piece four has a 43% chance. Thus, piece three is 0.48% of the total 
remainder and piece four is 0.36% of the total remainder. 
Notice that if the 5% threshold for Code section 2037 had been ex-
ceeded in Case 5, the amount included under Code section 2037 would 
have been $5,544, which is the value of X’s contingent remainder valued 
after O’s death ($660,000 * 0.14 * .06), and is the value of pieces three 
and four. $5,544 is also the amount that would have been included under 
Code section 2033 if O had not made his reversion contingent on his 
survival. Thus, we see that Code section 2037 includes zero while the 
analogous Code-section-2033 transaction would have included $5,544. 
Thus, the 5% rule of Code section 2037 breaks the equality of treatment. 
Lastly, suppose Case 5 were an irrevocable transfer to trust by O to 
pay income to W for life, remainder to Son if living, and if not, to 
Nephew. Next, suppose that a NICS-rule–reversal reform occurs that 
requires Nephew to survive to take possession, but the reform does not 
negate the transferor’s reversion. When O dies under the same assumed 
facts—on O’s death at age seventy-eight, the trust property is worth $1 
million, W is age eighty-one, Son is age sixty, and Nephew is age fifty—
$5,544 must be included in O’s federal gross estate under Code section 
2033, calculated as above. This result demonstrates that inartful NICS-
rule–reversal reforms lay a trap for the unwary. While such dispositions 
no longer result in a draconian inclusion amount as in Spiegel; they do 
                                                   
139 When a liquid flows in a pipe or sap in a tree, whenever a branch occurs, the 
flow divides into parts that are not necessarily equal. Further branching similarly divides 
the already divided flow. Thus, for any branch the aggregate sum of downstream flows 
equals the amount coming from that branch, assuming that the liquid is neither created, 
destroyed, nor added. Such is the case here. Future interests are divided and then divided 
again, and the aggregate value of downstream divisions equals the upstream value. 
Probability analysis diagrams these as probability trees. See, e.g., CHARLES M. 
GRINSTEAD & J. LAURIE SNELL, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY 24-25 (2d. rev. ed. 2006), 
available at http://math.dartmouth.edu/~prob/prob/prob.pdf. 
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result in some inclusion and they require complicated actuarial computa-
tions.140 
D. How Does the Four-Step Method to Analyze Section-2037 Situations 
Comport with Published Authorities? 
In its only meaningful ruling on the question, the Service describes 
in words how Code-section-2037 operates, but does not show the 
calculations. In Revenue Ruling 76-178,141 D transferred Blackacre to A 
for life, remainder to D if living, and if not, then to C or C’s estate. (This 
is the same scenario as our Case 2.) At D’s death, Blackacre was worth 
$100,000, D was male and age eighty-eight, A was female and age 
eighty-eight, and C was alive. The ruling describes the valuation as 
follows: 
The decedent’s [D’s] reversionary interest is de-
scribed as the present worth of the right of the decedent 
(a male aged 88) to receive $100,000 upon the death of 
A (a female aged 88), provided the decedent survives. 
The actuarial factor representing this described revers-
ionary interest is 0.43194. (This factor cannot be found 
in the tables contained in section 20.2031-10(f) of the 
regulations. Rather, it is a special factor that will be 
computed by the National Office upon submission of the 
information specified in section 20.2031-10(f) of the 
regulations.)142 
Revenue Ruling 76-178 makes Code-section-2037 calculations opa-
que. A Code-section-2037 calculation will always involve the probability 
that the decedent survive some person, event, or time period but the 
published materials account only for the last of those three situations—
the probability that decedent will survive for some period.143 Opacity is 
unwelcome here. To illustrate Code section 2037’s application to 
situations in which the decedent must survive some person, the four-step 
section-2037 evaluation method developed herein is applied to Revenue 
Ruling 76-178 below. 
                                                   
140 See Estate of Speigel v. Comm’r, 355 U.S. 701 (1949); supra text accompanying 
notes 12–22. 
141 1976-1 C.B. 273. 
142 Id. at 274. 
143 See supra note 131. 
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Step One. Examine all transfers made by decedent (O) and classify all 
interests created by such transfers. 
D created a life estate in A and a contingent remainder in C or C’s 
estate and a reversion in D. 
Step Two. With respect to each interest, determine whether possession of 
the property to which the interest relates can be obtained only by 
surviving O. 
The section-2037-triggering interest is the contingent remainder in C 
or C’s estate. 
Step Three. If section 2037 is triggered, value O’s reversion as it existed 
immediately before O’s death and determine if that value exceeds five 
percent of the value of the trust corpus immediately before O’s death. 
Immediately before D’s death, D owned a remainder if he survived 
A. The remainder factor for a remainder following a female life tenant 
age eighty-eight was 0.81569.144 Thus, at D’s death the remainder was 
worth $81,569,145 but we must multiply that value by the probability that 
a male age eighty-eight would survive a female age eighty-eight. The 
ruling does not provide the probability or any description of the manner 
of calculating the value of D’s reversion, but merely states “[t]he 
actuarial factor representing this described reversionary interest is 
                                                   
144 See Rev. Rul. 76–178, 1976-1 C.B. 274. “[I]f the valuation date of the decedent=s 
gross estate is after December 31, 1970, and before December 1, 1983, the present value 
of annuities, life estates, terms of years, remainders, and reversions is their present value 
determined under [Treasury Regulations Section 20.2031-7A (2000)]”. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2031-7A(c) (as amended 2000): 
If the valuation of the interest involved is dependent upon the 
continuation of or termination of one or more lives or upon a term 
certain concurrent with one or more lives, the factor for the present 
value is computed on the basis of interest at the rate of 6 percent a 
year, compounded annually, and life contingencies are determined as 
to each male and female life involved, from values that are set forth 
in Table LN. Table LN contains values that are taken from the life 
table for total males and the life table for total females appearing as 
Tables 2 and 3, respectively, in United States Life Tables: 1959–
1960, published by the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Public Health Service. Table LN and related factors are set forth in 
former § 20.2031–10 (as contained in the 26 CFR part 20 edition 
revised as of April 1, 1994). 
145 See Rev. Rul. 76–178, 1976–1 C.B. 274. 
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0.43194.”146 Analytically, this actuarial factor should be the remainder 
factor multiplied by the probability that D survives A. 
Because the value of D’s reversion exceeds 43% of the trust princi-
pal, that value exceeds 5%, and we proceed to Step Four. 
Step Four. Value the section-2037-triggering interests as they exist 
immediately after O’s death and include that value in O’s federal gross 
estate. 
Code section 2037 includes the value of remainder, which the ruling 
tells us is 0.81569 times $100,000, or $81,569.147 (But we already know 
that—we can read it from Table S in effect for 1976.) 
Notice that the result of Step Three is equal to the remainder value 
multiplied by a probability, and the result of Step Four is the remainder 
value. The ruling gives us the result of Step Three as 0.43194,148 and 
from that we can infer the probability. The probability a male age eighty-
eight would survive a female age eighty-eight is equal to Step Three 
divided by Step Four, or 0.43194 ÷ 0.81569, or 53%. Thus, we infer 
from Revenue Ruling 76-178 that under mortality data used for actuarial 
valuations in 1976, the probability that a male age eighty-eight would 
survive a female age eighty-eight is 53%. That seems odd. With sexed 
mortality tables, as were apparently used in 1976, one would expect that 
the probability that a male of one age would survive a female of same 
age would be less than 50%. Today, with unsexed mortality tables, the 
probability that one eighty-eight year old would survive another is 50%. 
Thus, the Four-Step Method to Analyze Section-2037 Situations de-
veloped in this Article is consistent with Revenue Ruling 76-178, with 
the possible exception of the unknown manner in which the survival 
probability was determined in Step Three. Again opacity here is unwel-
come, and the Service ought to have indicated how it determined the 
factor in Step Three and how it determined the probability that a male 
age eighty-eight would survive a female age eighty-eight. The fact that 
my four-step method to analyze section-2037 situations might not 
precisely comport with Revenue Ruling 76-178 does not especially 
trouble me. I have explained mine by reference to probability theory and 
life contingency actuarial mathematics. The Service has not. In addition, 
in a federal district court case the probability that one person survives 
                                                   
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
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another was relevant in determining rights in a tax foreclosure action.149 
An expert from the Service first filed a declaration stating a probability, 
but did not show a calculation method.150 Later, the agent filed another 
declaration providing a calculation method that the federal district judge 
described as “indecipherable.”151 In this Article, I have explained life 
contingency actuarial mathematics and provided a calculation method 
that is decipherable. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Let us return to the first future interest presented in this Article: O’s 
transfer of Blackacre to A for life then to B. Because a trust is not 
involved, the NICS rule applies virtually everywhere (even in jurisdic-
tions adopting UPC section 2-707); O has made a competed gift of O’s 
entire interest in Blackacre to which a gift tax applies; A has a life estate; 
B has an indefeasibly vested remainder; O does not have a reversion, and 
when O dies nothing is included in O’s federal gross estate.152 
Now suppose O transfers Blackacre to T as trustee to pay income to 
A for life, and then pay the trust property to B. In a jurisdiction in which 
the NICS rule continues to apply, the results are the same as in the prior 
paragraph. 
In a jurisdiction in which UPC section 2-707 applies, O has made a 
completed gift of her entire interest in Blackacre to which a gift tax 
applies; A has a life estate; B has a contingent remainder (B takes if B 
survives A); B’s descendants have a contingent remainder (B’s descen-
dants who survive A take if B predeceases A); and O’s heirs have a 
contingent remainder (O’s heirs determined at A’s death take if B 
predeceases A and none of B’s descendants survive A); O does not have a 
reversion, and when O dies nothing is included in O’s federal gross 
estate. 
                                                   
149 See United States v. Ryan, No. 04-0531-CV-W-GAF, 2005 WL 1429760, at *4 
(W.D. Mo. June 16, 2005). 
150 See id. 
151 Id. A month later, the court obviated the probability determination issue (the 
probability that husband would survive wife) by deciding that for purposes of foreclosing 
a tax lien against one spouse, while both spouses are alive, the spouses had equal rights in 
tenants-by-the-entireties property regardless of their probabilities of surviving each other. 
See United States v. Ryan, No. 04-0531-CV-W-GAF, 2005 WL 6153137, at *3 (W.D. 
Mo. July 19, 2005). 
152 Code section 2035(b) would include in O’s federal gross estate the gift tax paid 
on the transfer if O dies less than three years after making the gift. See I.R.C. § 2035(b). 
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In a jurisdiction that, by common law decision or by statute, has re-
versed the NICS rule, but does not create a substitute gift or apply the 
NICS rule reversal to O’s reversion, O’s gift is partially incomplete. A 
has a life estate; B has a contingent remainder (B takes if B survives A); 
O has a reversion, and if O dies while A is alive, the value of O’s 
reversion is included in O’s federal gross estate. This is our Case 2. The 
value of O’s gift equals the value of Blackacre at the time of transfer to 
trust minus the value of A’s life estate minus the value of B’s contingent 
remainder. The value of B’s contingent remainder for the gift tax 
calculation is the value of the remainder after A’s life estate multiplied by 
the probability that B survives A, with both determined at the time of the 
gift. When O dies, the actuarial value of O’s reversion is included in his 
federal gross estate under Code section 2033, and the value equals the 
value of the remainder after A’s life estate multiplied by the probability 
that A survives B, with both determined at the time of the O’s death.153 
In a jurisdiction that, by common law decision or by statute, has re-
versed the NICS, does not create a substitute gift in descendants of a 
predeceased donee, and does apply the NICS rule reversal to O’s 
reversion,154 O’s gift is partially incomplete. A has a life estate, B has a 
contingent remainder (B takes if B survives A), O has a reversion, and 
whoever the law designates to take if O’s reversion failed has a contin-
gent remainder. This situation is our Case 3. The value of O’s gift equals 
the value of Blackacre minus the value of A’s life estate minus the value 
of B’s contingent remainder minus the value of X’s contingent remain-
der. The value of B’s contingent remainder is the value of the remainder 
multiplied by the probability that B survives A, as determined at the time 
of the gift, and the value of X’s contingent remainder is the value of the 
                                                   
153 When valuing under Code section 2033, unlike section 2037, whether the 
valuation is made immediately before or immediately after O’s death is of no moment 
because the value of O’s reversion does not change when he dies; that value remains a 
function of the probability that A survives B, which does not markedly change on the day 
of O’s death. Conversely, when valuing under Code section 2037 (in Step Four), we 
value the triggering interest, the value of which changes dramatically on O’s death, 
because that section-2037-triggering interest no longer is discounted by the possibility 
that O might survive and cause the triggering interest to fail. See supra note 118. 
154 This situation might arise if a jurisdiction simply announced that all future 
interests are contingent on the holder’s surviving to the distribution. A reversion is a 
future interest and would come within that rule. Of course, who takes on the failure of a 
reversion would have to be decided. Perhaps a court would adopt a rule like UPC section 
2-707(d) and place the interest in the decedent’s heirs as determined on the distribution 
date. 
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remainder multiplied by the probability that A survives B multiplied by 
the probability A survives O, all determined at the time of the gift. When 
O dies, estate inclusion will occur, if at all, under Code section 2037. The 
value of O’s reversion immediately before death is the value of the 
remainder, based on A’s age at O’s death, multiplied by the probability 
that A survives B multiplied by the probability that X survives O, all 
determined at the time of the O’s death.155 
To summarize, if O transfers property and has no reversion, then the 
full value of the property is subject to a gift tax, but no part of the 
property will be subject to an estate tax. If O retains a reversion, either 
expressly or by operation of an inartful NICS rule reversal, then the 
value of the reversion will be subtracted in valuing the gift (although the 
subtracted amount often will be zero), and upon O’s death one must 
determine whether Code sections 2033 or 2037 require estate tax 
inclusion of the reversion. Both Code sections 2033 and 2037 require a 
determination of the probability of O surviving some person. Hence, the 
calculation method in Appendix A will always be relevant. In addition, if 
O’s reversion itself is subject to a condition that O survive until her 
reversion takes effect in possession, Code section 2037 controls, and the 
situation will likely involve multiple determinations of the probability of 
persons surviving each other. 
Whatever the merits of reversing the NICS rule, the UPC at least 
does it in a way that obviates difficult transfer tax determinations. In a 
NICS rule reversal, the transferor’s reversion should always be negated. 
If the reversion is not negated, then the analytical methods explained 
herein will be necessary if the transferor expressly retains a reversion 
lasting beyond his death (Code section 2033) or one terminating with his 
death (Code section 2037). 
                                                   
155 See supra note 153. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Calculating the Probability That y Will Survive x Using Table 90CM 
 
By definition, the following two probabilities are identical: (1) y will 
survive x; and (2) x will die and y will be alive at the moment of x’s 
death. 
The second probability is easier to calculate using data required by 
the Treasury Regulations. The Treasury Regulations require use of Table 
90CM to value interests dependent upon the termination of a life inter-
est.156 Table 90CM is a life table based on the experience of the entire 
United States population in the years around the 1990 United States 
Census.157 A life table is a device for exhibiting mortality data, and “is an 
indispensable component of many models in actuarial science.”158 
Table 90CM is published in Treasury Regulations Section 20.2031-
7(d)(7), and for ease of reference, is reproduced at the end of this 
appendix. Table 90CM consists of two columns: (1) a column containing 
ages between 0 and 110; and (2) a column headed “lx” containing the “l 
value” (the letter ell and not the number one) for each age in the first 
column.159 
                                                   
156 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) (2000). In addition to Table 90CM, for 
valuation dates after April 30, 1999, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(6) (2000) publishes 
Actuarial Table B, Term Certain Remainder Factors and Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) 
(2000) publishes Table S, Single Life Remainder Factors. Neither Table B nor Table S 
addresses valuations dependent upon one person surviving another. 
157 Table 90CM is published in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7) (2000) and in I.R.S. 
Publication 1457, Actuarial Factors, Book Aleph (July 1999), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1457_99.pdf. Publication 1457 describes Table 90CM as 
“taken from the Life Table for the Total Population appearing as Table 1, in ‘U.S. 
Decennial Life Tables for 1989-1991’ published by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics.” Id. at iii. 
158 NEWTON L. BOWERS, JR., HANS U. GERBER, JAMES C. HICKMAN, DONALD A. 
JONES & CECIL J. NESBITT, ACTUARIAL MATHEMATICS 51 (2d. ed. 1997). “In fact some 
scholars fix the date of the beginning of actuarial science as 1693. In that year, Edmund 
Halley published ‘An Estimate of the Degrees of the Mortality of Mankind, Drawn from 
Various Tables of Births and Funerals at the City of Breslau.’” Id. at 51–52. 
159 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, U.S. DECENNIAL LIFE TABLES FOR 1989-91, VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1, 
UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES 3 (1997), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
lifetables/life89_1_1.pdf. The “[n]umber surviving (lx) column shows the number of 
persons, starting with a cohort of 100,000 live births, who will survive to the exact age 
marking the beginning of the indicated age interval.” Id. Column 3 of the United States 
Life Tables (lx) is column 2 of Table 90CM. 
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The l value is the number of persons, starting with a cohort of 
100,000 live births, who will survive to the beginning of the indicated 
age interval.160 Table 90CM starts at age 0 when 100,000 persons are 
born, and ends at age 110 when all are dead.161 The l values for interme-
diate ages indicate the number alive at the exact beginning of the 
interval. For instance, the l value for age 79, denoted l79, is 49943, which 
indicates that 49,943 (nearly 50,000) of the 100,000 lives will live to 
attain at least age 79, which demonstrates that the median length of life 
under Table 90CM is about 79 years.162 
Probabilities of death and of survival can be obtained using the l val-
ues from Table 90CM and elementary probability concepts.163 The 
following probability concepts are relevant: 
Concept 1. The probability that a life age x will survive at least n years, 
from age x until age x+n equals 
 
 
 
 
164 
Concept 2. The probability that a life age x will die between ages x+n 
and x+n+m equals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
 165 
Concept 2 also can be described as the probability that a life, age x, 
will live at least n years (

 

 
) minus the probability that a life, age x, will 
live at least n+m years (

 

 
). For instance, the probability that x, 
presently age 50, will live at least 3 years to age 53 = 




  

	


0 .98392; the probability that x, presently age 50, will live at least 4 
                                                   
160 See id. The actuarial scholars note that under the life table method of actuarial 
calculations, the interpretation of lx as the number of persons living at age x is a 
“convenient aid”; however, lx is a “continuous function of x, and the tabulated values 
appear in mortality tables only for integral values of x.” CHESTER WALLACE JORDAN, 
SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES’ TEXTBOOK ON LIFE CONTINGENCIES 8 (2d ed. 1975). The matter 
is of little practical import with regard to tax calculations, as the Treasury Regulations 
require use of Table 90CM, rather than a continuous function. 
161 The manner of life table construction requires that there be an end year. 
Assigning such a year is a bit arbitrary, because some evidence exists of persons living 
past age 110. However, the number is so small that the table can be ended at age 110. In 
any event, we do not need to know why Table 90CM terminates at age 110, only that it 
does. 
162 See supra note 159, at 7, tbl. 1. 
163 See JORDAN, supra note 160, at 9. 
164 See JORDAN, supra note 160, at 9, equation 1.4. See also I.R.S. Publ’n 1457, 
supra note 131. 
165 See JORDAN, supra note 160, at 9, equation 1.8. 
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years to age 54 = 

	


  


	

  0.97756; and the probability that x, 
presently age 50, will die between ages 53 and 54 = 




 

	



 0.98392   0.97756   0.00636. 
Concept 3. In a life table, all deaths are assumed to occur uniformly 
throughout the year.166 
Concept 4. To calculate the probability that a life, age y, survives a life, 
age x, we observe that the condition that y survive x is satisfied in any 
year in which x dies and y survives. The condition that y survive x in any 
given year can occur by either of two independent events: (1) x dies and 
y lives that entire year, or (2) x dies that year and y dies that year and x 
dies first.167 
Concept 5. Events 1 and 2 described in Concept 4 are mutually exclusive 
(sometimes called disjoint), because they cannot occur at the same 
time.168 Event 1 requires that  y live an entire year, while event 2 requires 
that y die within that year; thus events 1 and 2 cannot both occur within 
any given year.169 When events are mutually exclusive, the probability 
that either event occurs is the arithmetic sum of the two probabilities.170 
For example, the weekend consists of two days: Saturday and Sunday. 
Any given day has a 1/7 probability of being either a Saturday or a 
Sunday. Because the condition of a weekend day can be satisfied by a 
day being a Saturday or a Sunday, the probability that any given day is a 
weekend day is 1/7 plus 1/7, or 2/7. 
Concept 6. The component events within events 1 and 2 are independent 
events; that is, the occurrence of one component event does not affect the 
probability that another component event will occur.171 Given indepen-
                                                   
166 Under the life table method, a uniform distribution of deaths throughout each 
year of age is assumed. See JORDAN, supra note 160, at 19; GEORGE KING, INSTITUTE OF 
ACTUARIES’ TEXT BOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTEREST, LIFE ANNUITIES, AND 
ASSURANCES, AND THEIR PRACTICAL APPLICATION: LIFE CONTINGENCIES 42 (2d ed. 
1902); available at http://www.archive.org/download/p2textbookofprin00instuoft/ 
p2textbookofprin00instuoft.pdf; M.A. MACKENZIE AND N.E. SHEPPARD, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LIFE CONTINGENCIES 22 (1931). 
167 See KING, supra note 166, at 42; MACKENZIE AND SHEPPARD, supra note 166, at 
22. 
168 See BLUMAN, supra note 136, at 44 (Addition Rule I); Introduction to Probability 
8, http://swd.ucsd.edu/Lecture2.pdf (last visited May 26, 2009); for a more traditional 
treatment of discrete probability, see GRINSTEAD & SNELL, supra note 139, at 1–35. 
169 See BLUMAN, supra note 136, at 45. 
170 See BLUMAN, supra note 168, at 45. 
171 See BLUMAN, supra note 168, at 57 (Multiplication Rule I). 
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dent events, if a condition can be satisfied only by events simultaneously 
occurring, the probabilities of each event are multiplied together to 
calculate the probability of the condition occurring.172 For instance, any 
given day has a 0.2430 probability of being in a leap year173 and any 
given day has a 2/7 chance of being a weekend day. The probability that 
any given day is both in a leap year and a weekend day is 0.2430 
multiplied by 2/7, or 0.06943. 
Concept 7. The probability that y will survive x is the sum of all of the 
annual probabilities defined in Concept 4.174 
Using these probability concepts and the l values of Table 90CM, we 
will calculate the probability that y, age 70, will survive x, age 50. 
To calculate the probability that y, presently age 70, will survive x, 
presently age 50, we first consider the first year from the present and 
calculate the probability that x dies in the first year and that y survives 
him. That “first annual probability” is composed of the sum of two 
partial probabilities: (1) the probability that x dies during the first year 
and y survives to the end of the first year, and (2) the probability that 
both die in the first year, but x dies first. (Concept 4.) Because either 
event 1 or event 2 will satisfy the condition that x dies in the first year 
and y survives him, the partial probabilities 1 and 2 are added. (Concept 
5.) 
Next, we will consider the second year from the present and calcu-
late the probability that x dies in the second year and that y survives him. 
That “second annual probability” is composed of the sum of two partial 
probabilities: (1) the probability that x dies during the second year and y 
survives to the end of the second year, and (2) the probability that both 
                                                   
172 See BLUMAN, supra note 168, at 58. 
173 The probability that any given day is in a leap year is calculated as follows: First, 
a leap year has 366 days, while a non-leap year has 365. Second, 1 of every 4 years is a 
leap year, except only 1 out of every 4 century years is a leap year; century years are leap 
years only if evenly divisible by 400. For example, year 2000 was a leap year, but year 
1900 was not. See Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Physics Lab., Time & Frequency 
Div., Frequently Asked Questions, http://tf.nist.gov/timefreq/general/leaps.htm (last 
visited May 20, 2009). Thus, there are 97 leap years per 400 years (rather than 100), and 
303 non-leap years; each leap year has 366 days, and each non-leap year has 365. Thus, 
the probability that any given day is a day in a leap year is 





 

 = 0.2430. 
For other interesting calculations relating to the 400-year leap cycle, see The Volokh 
Conspiracy, Some (I Hope Midly Interesting) Pedantry About Day of Week Frequency, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1225300002.shtml (last visited May 20, 2009). 
174 See KING, supra note 166, at 43, 48–50; MACKENZIE AND SHEPPARD, supra note 
166, at 22–23. 
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die in the second year, but x dies first. The partial probabilities 1 and 2 
are added. (Concepts 4 and 5.) 
We will continue the series of annual probability calculations until 
we run out of years on Table 90CM. We then will sum all the annual 
probabilities, and that sum will be the probability that y, presently age 
70, will survive x, presently age 50. (Concept 7.) Along the way, we will 
develop a general solution that we can automate by using a spreadsheet. 
These concepts are applied below: 
I. Calculate the First Annual Probability: The condition that y 
survive x in any given year can occur by either of two mutually 
exclusive, disjoint events: (1) x dies and y lives that entire year, 
OR (2) x dies that year and y dies that year and x dies first. 
A. Calculate Partial Probability 1: the probability that (a) x,  
presently age 50, dies between ages 50 and 51 and (b) y,  
presently age 70, survives the entire year to age 71. 
1. Partial Probability 1(a) is the probability that x dies be-
tween ages 50 and 51. Under Concept 2, that probability 
is as follows: 
Partial Probability 1(a) = 










	

	



	


1 0.99511 = A = 0.00489175 
2. Partial Probability 1(b) is the probability that y will live 
from age 70 to at least age 71. It is l71 divided by l70. 
(Concept 1.) 
Partial Probability 1(b) 




  


	

 0.97273 
3. Partial Probability 1 is calculated by multiplying Partial 
Probability 1(a) by Partial Probability 1(b), because (a) 
and (b) are independent events. (Concept 6.) 
Partial Probability 1 = 0.00489 * 0.97273 = 0.00476 
B. Calculate Partial Probability 2 is the probability that (a) x, 
presently age 50, dies between age 50 and 51 and (b) y, pre-
sently age 70, dies between age 70 and 71 and (c) x dies first 
in that year. 
                                                   
175 The values in Table 90CM are five figures. Consequently, all calculations are 
presented at five significant figures. 
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1. Partial Probability 2(a) is the probability that x, presently 
age 50, dies between ages 50 and 51, was calculated 
above as Partial Probability 1(a), and is 0.00489. 
2. Partial Probability 2(b) is the probability that y dies be-
tween ages 70 and 71. Under Concept 2, that probability 
is as follows: Partial Probability 2(b) = 
 











	


	




	

 0.02727 
3. Partial Probability 2(c) is the probability that x dies first 
in a year in which both x and y die. The life table method 
assumes a uniform distribution of deaths (Concept 3), so 
there is an equal chance of each dying first in a year in 
which both die. 
Partial Probability 2(c) is equal to 0.5. 
4. Partial Probability 2 is calculated by multiplying Partial 
Probability 2(a) by Partial Probability 2(b) and by Partial 
Probability 2(c) because they are “and” events. 
(Concept 6.) Partial Probability 2 =  
0.0048934 * 0.97273 * 0.5 = 0.0023800 
C. The First Annual Probability is the sum of Partial Probability 
1 and Partial Probability 2 
= 0.0047599 + 0.000066724 = 0.0071399 
II. Calculate the Second Annual Probability 
A. Calculate Partial Probability 1: the probability that (a) x, 
presently age 50, dies between ages 51 and 52 and (b) y, 
presently age 70, survives to at least age 72. 
1. Partial Probability 1(a) is the probability that x, presently 
age 50, dies between ages 51 and 52. Under Concept 2, 
that probability is as follows: 
Partial Probability 1(a) = 










91918
92370

91424
92370
 0.0053481 
2. Partial Probability 1(b) is the probability that y, presently 
age 70, lives to at least age 72. It is l72 divided by l70. 
(Concept 1.) 
Partial Probability 1(b) = 




    

	

	

   0.94376 
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3. Partial Probability 1 is calculated by multiplying Partial 
Probability 1(a) by Partial Probability 1(b), because (a) 
and (b) are “and” events. (Concept 6.) 
Partial Probability 1 = 
0.0053481 * 0.94376 = 0.0050473 
B. Calculate Partial Probability 2, the probability that (a) x, 
presently age 50, dies between ages 51 and 52 and (b) y,  
presently age 70, dies between ages 71 and 72 and (c) x dies 
first in that year. 
1. Partial Probability 2(a) is the probability that x dies be-
tween ages 51 and 52. It was calculated above as Partial 
Probability 1(a), and is 0.0053481. 
2. Partial Probability 2(b) is the probability that y dies be-
tween ages 71 and 72. Under Concept 2, that probability 
is as follows: 
Partial Probability 2(b) = 














69411
71357

67344
71357
 0.028967 
3. Partial Probability 2(c) is the probability that x dies first 
in a year in which both x and y die. Partial Probability 
2(c) is equal to 0.5. 
4. Partial Probability 2 is calculated by multiplying Partial 
Probability 2(a) by Partial Probability 2(b) and by Partial 
Probability 2(c) because they are “and” events. 
(Concept 6.) Partial Probability 2 = 
0.0053481 * 0.028967 * 0.5 = 0.000077459 
C. The Second Annual Probability is the sum of Partial Proba-
bility 1 and Partial Probability 2 
Second Annual Probability 
= 0.0050473 + 0.000077459 = 0.0051247. 
III. Calculate The Third Annual Probability 
A. The Third Annual Probability is the probability that (a) x, 
presently age 50, dies between ages 52 and 53 and (b) y,  
presently age 70, survives to at least age 73. Thus, l values 
are those for the next higher year; obviously, l values for the 
initial conditions of age 50 and age 70 remain the same. 
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B. Important probabilities are: 
1. x dies between ages 52 and 53, which equals 




 - 




 = 

	

 - 

	

 = 0.0058352 
2. y dies between ages 72 and 73, which equals 




 - 




 = 

	

	

 - 


	

 = 0.030691 
3. y will live from age 70 to at least age 73, which equals 




 = 


	

 = 0.91307 
C. The Third Annual Probability demonstrates that a general 
solution can be generated. Probability 1 of each annual prob-
ability equals B1 multiplied by B3. Probability 2 of each an-
nual probability equals B1 multiplied by B2 multiplied by ½. 
Thus, for each year, the annual probability = (B1 times B3) 
plus (B1 times B2 times 2). 
D. The general solution expressed in C is intuitive. Each annual 
probability is an equation in which two terms are added. The 
first term is the probability that x dies during the relevant 
year and y survives to its end. The second term is the one-
half of the probability that both will die in the relevant year. 
E. The Third Annual Probability = (B1 * B3) plus (B1 * B2 
times 2) = (0.0058352 * 0.91307) + (0.0058352 * 
0.030691*0.5) = 0.0054175. 
IV. Calculate the Fourth Annual Probability 
A. The Fourth Annual Probability is the probability that (a) x, 
presently age 50, dies between ages 53 and 54 and (b) y,  
presently age 70, survives to at least age 74. 
B. Important probabilities are: 
1. x dies between ages 53 and 54, which equals 






	




	




	

 0.0063567 
2. y dies between ages 73 and 74, which equals 




 - 

	


 = 


	

 - 


	

 = 0.032260 
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3. y will live from age 70 to at least age 74, which equals 

	


 = 


	

 = 0.88081 
C. The general solution shows that the Fourth Annual Proba-
bility 
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= (0.0063657*0.88081)+(0.0063657*0.032260*0.5) 
= 0.0057097 
V. For a more general solution, we can further generalize the 
formula in IV. C above. 
A. For two persons, age x and y, the annual probability for the 
nth year that y survives x is: 
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For instance, n=1 for the First Annual Probability, and 
n=2 for the Second Annual Probability. 
B. How Long Does the Series Continue? 
Under Table 90CM, all lives fail by age 110.176 Thus, 
annual probability calculations are made until the oldest of 
the lives reaches 110, because at that point, it is certain that 
the probability of future survival by that person is zero. 
For our example, where y is age 70 and x is age 50, forty 
annual probabilities must be calculated, one for each year 
until y reaches age 110. 
For any problem, the number of Annual Probabilities to 
be calculated will equal 110 minus the oldest age of x and y. 
C. The most general solution for two persons, age x and y, 
where y is the greater of the two ages, the probability that y 
survives x is: 
 
 
 



 



   











 



   


  



   0.5 

  
                                                   
176 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(4). 
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D. In our example, for y, age 70, and x, age 50, the probability 
that y survives x is 0.15239 or 15.239%.177 
 
APPENDIX CONCLUSION 
The probability that y will survive x determined under a life table is 
the sum of a series of annual probabilities. 
Under the most easily expressed general solution, each annual prob-
ability requires the calculation of three probabilities. Calculating those 
three probabilities requires reading six l numbers from Table 90CM. 
Two of the six remain constant; thus, for each year after the first, only 
four new l numbers are read from the table. 
A spreadsheet can be used to make these calculations easily. After 
the data from Table 90CM has been input, only a few formulae based on 
looking up values in the table are necessary. The VLOOKUP function in 
Microsoft Excel worksheets works to look up the values. After they are 
multiplied and each annual probability is determined, the annual proba-
bilities can be easily summed up in the spreadsheet. 
  
                                                   
177 The probability calculated under the manner in this appendix—that the 
probability that y, age 70, will survive x, age 50, using Table 90CM data equals 
15.239%—agrees to five significant figures with the result generated by a commercial 
software program, Tiger Tables, available at www.TigerTables.com. In addition, the 
general solution generated here agrees with the solutions generated by Tiger Tables for 
all of the many other age combinations tested by the author. Tiger Tables does not 
explain its calculation method, but the Tiger Tables website does advertise that the 
software is used by the Service. 
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Table 90CM 
 
Age lx Age lx Age lx 
0 100000 37 95969 74 62852 
1 99064 38 95780 75 60449 
2 98992 39 95581 76 57955 
3 98944 40 95373 77 55373 
4 98907 41 95156 78 52704 
5 98877 42 94928 79 49943 
6 98850 43 94687 80 47084 
7 98826 44 94431 81 44129 
8 98803 45 94154 82 41091 
9 98783 46 93855 83 37994 
10 98766 47 93528 84 34876 
11 98750 48 93173 85 31770 
12 98734 49 92787 86 28687 
13 98713 50 92370 87 25638 
14 98681 51 91918 88 22658 
15 98635 52 91424 89 19783 
16 98573 53 90885 90 17046 
17 98497 54 90297 91 14466 
18 98409 55 89658 92 12066 
19 98314 56 88965 93 9884 
20 98215 57 88214 94 7951 
21 98113 58 87397 95 6282 
22 98006 59 86506 96 4868 
23 97896 60 85537 97 3694 
24 97784 61 84490 98 2745 
25 97671 62 83368 99 1999 
26 97556 63 82169 100 1424 
27 97441 64 80887 101 991 
28 97322 65 79519 102 672 
29 97199 66 78066 103 443 
30 97070 67 76531 104 284 
31 96934 68 74907 105 175 
32 96791 69 73186 106 105 
33 96642 70 71357 107 60 
34 96485 71 69411 108 33 
35 96322 72 67344 109 17 
36 96150 73 65154 110 0 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Calculate the Probability That y Will Survive x Using Table 2000CM 
 
During the printing of this article, the Treasury Regulations were 
amended “to reflect the most recent mortality experience available,” now 
contained in Table 2000 CM.178 For valuation dates after May 1, 2009, 
Table 2000 CM replaces Table 90 CM.179 
 
The algorithm provided in Appendix A remains valid for calculating 
survival probabilities for periods after May 1, 2009; simply substitute the 
lx values from Table 2000 CM for those from Table 90 CM. 
 
Appendix A derived a formula for the annual probability for the nth year 
that y survives x, as:180 
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This Appendix B repeats the Appendix A example, but using Table 2000 
CM data. Recall that in the example, y is age 70 and x is age 50. Forty 
annual probabilities must be calculated, one for each year until y reaches 
age 110 to determine the probability that y survives x.181 
 
The first annual probability, where n=1, is  
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93591-93180
93591
 * 
73001
74794
   
93591-93180
93591
 * 
74794-73001
74794
 * 0.5 = 0.0042862 + 
0.000052637 = 0.0043388 
                                                   
178 Table 2000 CM is published as the last table in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7T(d)(7) 
(2009), and is reproduced at the end of this Appendix B. 
179 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7T(c) (2009). 
180 See infra. 
181 Recall that under the general solution of Appendix A, annual probability 
calculations are made until the oldest of the two lives reaches 110. Thus, the number of 
annual probability calculations is 110-y, where y is the older of the two ages. See infra. 
When y is 70, 110-y equals 40. 
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The second annual probability, where n=2, is  
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93180-92741
93591
 * 
71092
74794
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93591
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 * 0.5 = 0.0044585 +  
 
0.00005986 = 0.0045183 
 
The third annual probability, where n=3, is  
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92741-92270
93591
 * 



74794
   
92741-92270
93591
 * 
71092-69056
74794
 * 0.5=  
 
0.0046464 + 0.000068496 = 0.0047149 
 
Succeeding annual probabilities are calculated until the last of the series, 
which in our example is the fortieth annual probability, i.e., n=40. 
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 
21443-18472
93591
 * 

74794
   
21443-18472
93591
 * 
11-0
74794
 * 0.5 = + 0.0000023343 = 
 
0.0000023343 
 
The 40 annual probabilities are added together, and the probability that y 
age 70 survives x age 50, using the morality data in Table 2000 CM is 
0.13928 or 13.928%. Using the data from Table 90 CM, the probability 
was 0.15239 or 15.239%.182 
                                                   
182 The probability calculated in this Appendix B—the probability that y age 70 will 
survive x age 50 using Table 2000CM data equals 13.928%—agrees to five significant 
figures with the result generated by a commercial software program, Tiger Tables, 
available at www.TigerTables.com, when Tiger Tables is instructed to use the “Current 
Mortality Table.” The Appendix A algorithm and Tiger Tables also generate identical 
results when both use Table 90 CM data. See infra note 177. 
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Within the text of the article, when illustrating the application of section 
2037, three survival probabilities are used: that a 60 year old will survive 
an 81 year old, a 78 year old will survive an 81 year old, and a 50 year 
old will survive an 81 year old. The respective probabilities calculated 
under Tables 90 CM and 2000 CM are as follows: 
age age 
Probability that a life of column 1 age 
survives a life of column 2 age 
Table 90 CM Table 2000 CM 
60 81 0.86 0.88 
78 81 0.57 0.57 
50 81 0.94 0.94 
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Table 2000 CM 
 
Age lx Age lx Age lx 
0 100000 37 96921 74 66882 
1 99305 38 96767 75 64561 
2 99255 39 96600 76 62091 
3 99222 40 96419 77 59476 
4 99197 41 96223 78 56721 
5 99176 42 96010 79 53833 
6 99158 43 95782 80 50819 
7 99140 44 95535 81 47694 
8 99124 45 95268 82 44475 
9 99110 46 94981 83 41181 
10 99097 47 94670 84 37837 
11 99085 48 94335 85 34471 
12 99073 49 93975 86 31114 
13 99057 50 93591 87 27799 
14 99033 51 93180 88 24564 
15 98998 52 92741 89 21443 
16 98950 53 92270 90 18472 
17 98891 54 91762 91 15685 
18 98822 55 91211 92 13111 
19 98745 56 90607 93 10773 
20 98664 57 89947 94 8690 
21 98577 58 89225 95 6871 
22 98485 59 88441 96 5315 
23 98390 60 87595 97 4016 
24 98295 61 86681 98 2959 
25 98202 62 85691 99 2122 
26 98111 63 84620 100 1477 
27 98022 64 83465 101 997 
28 97934 65 82224 102 650 
29 97844 66 80916 103 410 
30 97750 67 79530 104 248 
31 97652 68 78054 105 144 
32 97549 69 76478 106 81 
33 97441 70 74794 107 43 
34 97324 71 73001 108 22 
35 97199 72 71092 109 11 
36 97065 73 69056 110 0 
 
